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 The country of Laos is a developing nation that is geographically endowed with 
significant hydropower assets. Hydropower represents one of very few quick and 
profitable, exportable resources for Laos as a least developed country, and is seen as the 
avenue of escape from poverty for the nation. In the past two decades, Laos has seen both 
booms and busts in hydropower development, which has raised questions to 
hydropower's actual contributions to economic growth, and the consequences of large 
scale hydropower development. 
 This research examines trends and patterns in Laotian hydropower development 
in the past two decades. The study analyzes contributing factors to development patterns 
in terms of investment, policy, and geopolitic. Several consequences of hydropower 
development in Laos are also discussed. Overall I find that despite positive statements 
concerning hydropower, the actual contributions hydropower has in the Laotian context 
are smaller than anticipated. These benefits need to be weighed against the potential 






 Hydropower development in the form of the building of hydropower dams for 
export revenue as well as domestic demand, has become a key element in national 
solutions for transforming an entire peripheral region, providing an escape from poverty 
and introducing an element of control over nature (Baghel and Nüsser 2010). 
Hydropower is currently the leading renewable energy source used by electric utilities to 
generate electric power with several advantages over conventional power production. The 
major advantages of hydropower include: a source of cheap power, little air pollution, 
long life span, and limited thermal pollution (Kaygusuz 2009, U.S. Dept. of Energy 
2011). These advantages are critical when considering the concerns of energy production 
in the context of global climate change. Yet despite the apparent advantages, the 
construction of hydropower projects is not without controversy.  
The development of hydropower due to its nature of affecting rivers and water 
represents what Hardin (1968) referred to as the “tragedy of the commons,” where an un-
owned resource can be subject to misuse and degradation. Previous research concerning 
hydropower development in general has identified several key factors that hydropower 
development has impacted or is affected by. These  range from economic concerns in 
terms of markets and contribution to the national economy (Altinbilek 2002, Mansuell 
2004, Virtanen 2006), socio-economic issues of livelihood loss and resettlement (Brown 




inundated land, altered hydrology and changed river basins (Graf 1999, Magilligan and 
Nislow 2005), the role of policy and planning in the mitigation of effects and in the 
development of hydropower resources (FIVAS 2007, Mollinga 2010), and  the 
political/geopolitical situations of domestic and shared rivers (Hirsch 2010, Shmueli 
1999). These factors have been at the center of a highly contested natural resource debate, 
especially in Laos and the Mekong River Basin for the last 25 years (Bakker 1999, 
Sneddon and Fox 2006, Smitts and Bush 2010).  
The country of Laos is a developing nation that is geographically endowed with 
significant hydropower assets that is in the process of developing hydropower resources. 
Hydropower represents one of a very few quick, profitable, and exportable resources for 
Laos as a least developed country, and is seen as the avenue of escape from poverty for 
the nation and people (ADB 2002, EdL 2010b, Smits and Bush 2010). Investment in 
hydropower has been extensive within recent years as a result of Laotian efforts to spur 
economic development and decrease poverty. Much of this investment has come from 
donors and multilateral funding agencies such as the Asian Development Bank and the 
World Bank. Private investment has come from countries such as Thailand, China, and 
Malaysia as well as countries which on face value seem to have no stake in Laos such as 
Norway (Hirsch 2010, McDonald et al. 2009). As an example of this investment, the 
Nam Theun 2 hydropower project, which begun in 2005, represented the largest foreign 
investment in Laos at the time at over 1.6 billion dollars of foreign direct investment from 
various sources including Thailand, China, the World Bank, and the Asian Development 
Bank. The project is expected to produce revenues for Laos of nearly 2 billion dollars a 




News 2005, Smits and Bush 2010). Another example is the Theun-Hinboun project 
which was the test case for the Nam Theun 2 project. This project has produced U.S.$ 
275 million in its first four years of operation. Annual receipts from the Theun-Hinboun 
project alone represent 7.5% of Laos’ domestic state revenue (Barney 2007, 14).  
 In the past two decades, Laos has seen different patterns of hydropower 
development, from very little development in the early 1990’s, to rapid, large scale 
development in the new millennium. In the period of time leading up to the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis, hydropower development projects were planned and agreements signed 
to provide power to neighboring countries providing export revenue. Yet there was little 
actual construction undertaken on said projects and few projects actually came online. 
After 1998 and into the new millennium, a new spurt of hydropower projects have been 
built, or planned for the future resulting in increased energy production as well as an 
increasing number of potential dam projects. What explains this change in the patterns of 
hydropower development in the past 20 years? How do the key factors mentioned above 
to the patterns present? What has promoted or hinder development in the last two 
decades? What are the impacts of hydropower development in Laos? What are the future 
prospects of hydropower development in Laos given the past and current patterns? 
 Previous research has focused primarily on examining the consequences of 
hydropower development in terms of its economic, environmental, and socio-economic 
effects. An example of such research is a previous report by World Commission on Dams 
(WCD) in 2000 that attempted to find universally acceptable answers that would appease 
dam and hydropower supporters and critics, but was rejected by both sides of the debate 




and deserve further investigation (Moore et al. 2010). Research however has not 
examined the patterns of development as extensively compared to the effects of 
hydropower development in Laos. These patterns are in multiple forms including the 
spatial pattern of where hydropower projects are being built in Laos, production patterns, 
and the patterns of consequences. While the effects are important to understand, 
knowledge of what patterns are present and what influences them is also important for 
discussion.  
 The goal of this research is to study the Laotian hydropower sector, by providing 
a broad picture of hydropower development, and accounting for multiple factors that 
influence the hydropower development process. I ask what patterns have presented 
themselves in hydropower development in the past two decades. I also inquire to what 
factors have contributed to past and present patterns, as well as the consequences of these 
development patterns. Lastly, given the patterns and trends present, I discuss the future 
prospects of hydropower development in Laos in relation to constraints and enablers. The 
time period is chosen due to the availability of data for this era, as well as being a period 
where distinct changes in the patterns of development are present. This research does not 
attempt to mollify parties in either the pro-development or anti-development camp, but 
offers an independent insight into the issues at hand. Certain patterns may be present 
when examining past and present trends in hydropower development. This raises the 
question of how they are influenced by the key factors that are linked to development. 
Several key factors have been identified due to their prominence to their contribution to 
hydropower development and the amount of debate they entail when discussing 




development patterns in Laos in terms of contributions, causes and consequences, then 
analyze these factor’s relationship to hydropower in Laos. Contributions to hydropower 
development include: economics in terms of investors, government policy and plans that 
have promoted development, and the regional geopolitical situation, with a lack of 
development by regional neighbors have contributed the development of hydropower. 
Consequences of the subsequent development include changes in socio-economic 
variables, changes in mitigation, compensation, and resettlement strategies and policies, 
and the creation of potential geopolitical conflict due to the development of the Mekong 
River. Research on examining the influences and consequences of hydropower 
development is necessary in order to create better policy, supporting better practices in 
terms of the awarding of hydropower projects, and creating sustainable development, and 
mitigating the negative effects of hydro-development, all which may serve to influence 
the future of hydropower in general. 
Why Laos? 
 Hydropower’s importance to the Laotian state is paralleled within scholastic 
literature (Smits and Bush 2010), government documents (EdL 2010a), and mainstream 
media (BBC 2005), there is still room for more analysis. As Caetano de Souza (2008) 
points out, developed nations have more than 70% of their hydropower potential already 
utilized, while the developing world is the new focus for hydropower development. 
Hydropower is extremely important in Laos for its economic and social development, 
entailing costs and benefits at multiple spatial scales, both of which are important to 
understand when considering hydropower development in a global as well as local and 




the Laotian experience. Understanding the Laotian effort at hydropower development 
may offer solutions to the primary issues that can be applied on a global context in 
support of or as a caution against future large scale hydropower development. 
 The study of Laos also represents a chance to gain a further understanding of 
geopolitical relations concerning the Mekong River, which is shared by six nations, all 
who have some stake in the development and usage of the river. Development plans for 
the Mekong have ebbed and flowed with events and ideologies over the past 50 years 
(Hirsch 2010, 313). The changing geographic, political, and economic environment of the 
region is a major influence. These environments, both promote it, and serve as a 
detriment to further hydropower development not only on the Mekong, but on 
hydropower development in the region as a whole. Laos’s position on the Mekong gives 
it an array of options in its development strategy. Studying Laos’s hydropower 
development provides in general an opportunity to examine how various factors affect 
not only the development strategy of a state, but the debate over social, economic, and 
environmental effects as well. By examining the patterns of development, we can better 
understand the processes that are involved in decision making, and hopefully provide 
more realistic recommendations for future action that will both promote hydropower 
development, while attempting to mitigate the negative effects. 
 The thesis is laid out as follows. First, a literature review is conducted that 
surveys the key factors as well as current studies of hydropower, and the sector in 
general. I then present the methodology of the thesis detailing the data sources, their 
utilization, and how the data is analyzed. The next chapter details past development and 




utilizing primarily qualitative analysis, but supported in certain cases through quantitative 
descriptive statistical analysis, I examine the patterns of hydropower development in 
Laos, and the influence the key factors have had in shaping them. I also examine the 
impacts of development in terms of mitigation and resettlement consequences, as well as 
the impact of development upon socio-economic variables. Through document analysis 
and descriptive statistical analysis of official documents, reports by international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), and other secondary 
documents, I seek answers to how these factors affect hydropower development patterns. 
Following this, I discuss the results of the analysis, and open inquiry on future trends and 
patterns of hydropower development in Laos. Lastly I conclude with a summary and  







 Hydropower assets are continuing to be developed throughout the developing 
world, financed commonly by some developed nations who may have a major stake in 
the developing state (McDonald et al. 2009). The hydropower sector and its impacts have 
been the subject of a vast amount of literature and from multiple disciplines. As alluded 
to in the introduction, previous research has identified several primary factors that 
hydropower development affects or is influenced by. Several disciplines ranging from 
geography, economics, and political science have contributed to the understanding of the 
issues through careful analysis of problems related to the development of hydropower. 
Yet gaps remain in the discussions on patterns of development, and how these can affect 
outcomes related to hydropower. This literature review covers some of the various 
important geographic, political, economic, and environmental aspects that have been 
identified by previous research as concerning the hydropower sector and development.  
Scale 
 Starting from a geographic perspective, hydropower development entails elements 
of scale, not only on what scale impacts happen, but to what if any scale is the 
appropriate one for analysis. Essentially scale presents two problems: the first being what 
scale is appropriate to study a phenomenon at while the second problem is how scale can 




 and action occurs.  This is not to be confused with the concept of size, while important, 
is simply examining how large or small a project is in several different ways. The 
question of spatiality and geographic scales is not a new one for those working from a 
geographic perspective. Agnew (1994, 2002) notes that research has moved from a static 
view of analysis at one scale or another (ex: national or global), to a more comprehensive 
view that accounts for the recent trends in world politics and the world economy, ever 
more critical in issues of hydropower. Agnew (2002) also offers what we mean by 
geographic scale, which “refers to the level of geographic resolution at which a given 
phenomenon is thought about, acted on, or studied (139).” Howitt (2003) as well 
discusses what is meant by scale, noting that scale is not an ontological given (Howitt 
2003, 140). For Howitt, scale is not a fixed, dichotomous concept such as global and 
local. Issues such as hydropower are not reducible to a single dimension; there is a need 
to conceptualize and analyze the interconnections between scales and the simultaneity of 
those connections (Howitt 2003, 139). This raises the question of what if any geographic 
scale we should analyze the patterns of hydropower development. Concerned with how 
geographic questions tied to international relations were being addressed, Agnew (1994) 
focuses on the tendency for political science and international relations to be focused 
primarily on the state level, and how this understanding of the “state as a container,” view 
can distort analysis of various processes, such as water related issues and in essence 
hydropower development (Furlong 2008, 812). Furlong (2006, 2008) in her analysis of 
trans-boundary waters adds to the idea of scale and transcendence by illustrating that 
some issues are illuminated, but obfuscates many more by focusing only on the state 




 Research concerned on a general level about human interaction with the 
environment has not until recently considered the effect scale may have upon perception 
and outcomes. Giordano (2003) notes this gap in his research on applying geographic 
concepts to the problem of the commons in relation to natural resources. Giordano 
focuses on how the concepts of scale and space affect not only the definition of the 
commons problem, but the geographic nature of the problem as well (Giordano 2003). He 
notes that as a result of scale and space, the movement of natural resources, such as a 
river will not only influence exploitation outcomes, but will influence perceptions of risk 
and time as well (Giordano 2003, 370). Giordano concludes that solutions to commons 
problems need to vary by both scale and spatial nature.  
 In general, concerns of natural resources and watershed management entail an 
element of scale. Populist accounts focused at a broad national scale have stated that a 
superior process will dominate, disrupt, and extract resources from a subordinate place; 
however this perspective may not provide a complete picture (Steinberg and Clark 1999, 
479). Questions of perception of benefits and costs across different geographic scales are 
raised as well. Tilt et al. (2009) correctly notes that analysis at different spatial scales will 
result in very different conclusions raised. Giordano (2003) as well comes to the same 
conclusion, and also advocates that the transferability across scales of resource policy in 
general and commons policy in particular should be questioned, not merely assumed 
(Giordano 2003, 372). Policies and practices that were created on a certain scale by actors 
at specific scales may not be as applicable at a different scale. The nature of the natural 
resource problems as well can change whether one is focused upon one specific scale or 




 What is clear from this analysis of scale is that processes and actions can and do 
transcend geographic and political levels. Clearly an analysis of the hydropower sector 
and of the patterns of development in general that wishes to provide a holistic picture 
must take into account multiple scales, with no one scale being better or more important 
than the other. Scale itself must also be considered as an additional context when 
examining the issues of hydropower development. Reports with a national scale of focus 
may state very different conclusions and recommendations that reports conducted with a 
local scale focus. There must be recognition of the relationships between scales, not just 
simply jumping between them (Howitt 2003, 141). At times a focus upon a specific scale 
can as  Furlong (2008) and Mollinga (2010) have pointed out, serve as a useful level of 
analysis, but we must be aware that this focus can result in different perceptions and 
conclusions raised. While different scales will result in different privileges, one scale 
should not be privileged over another for example, as more political or environmental 
(Morrill 1999b, 48). Scale is helpful in this context that it allows for the realization that 
hydropower development can have effects across scales, but we must keep in mind that a 
focus on one scale or another will result in distorted perceptions and conclusions. 
Environmental and Social Impacts 
 The environmental impacts of hydropower development are well documented 
from a geographic perspective. Geographers and NGO’s concerned with water resource 
issues have noted the destructive capability of large and even small scale hydropower 
development projects (Magilligan and Nislow 2005). The geomorphic and hydrological 
consequences of dam building in the American context have been linked to large scale 




agricultural uses has resulted in greater change to the environment than climate change 
(Graf 1999, 2005). Literature about the environmental and social aspects of hydropower 
examines the environmental risks; the hydropower production potential; and the social 
impacts of hydropower, such as impacts upon livelihoods, personal economic stability, 
and resettlement (Altinbilek 2002, Anderson et al. 2006, Bakis 2007, Banfi et al. 2010, 
Kundzewicz et al. 2009, Li 2002, Shmueli 1999). These analyses have focused upon the 
effects of the building of hydropower projects, yet in general, have had little to say on the 
patterns of hydropower development, or how those patterns are influenced.  
 From a technological standpoint, researchers concerned with the environmental 
consequences and hydropower potential have made a number of inroads in estimations of 
impacts and potential for development. Assessments of hydropower projects have utilized 
a multitude of methods of analysis. Kusre et al. (2010) used a combination of GIS 
technology and hydrological modeling techniques to identify potential dam sites in India, 
as well as estimate the power production potential. Caetano de Souza’s (2008) 
assessment of Brazilian hydropower plants examined the role the climate and physical 
geography play in hydropower production, while attempting to use an environmental 
index to account for potential barriers to the installation of a hydropower plant. These 
works however, are not overly concerned about the possible social, economic, and 
political effects of dam building. Caetano de Souza recognizes that environmental 
indexes are important tools for decision making, but they do not take into account 
economic, social, financial, and political factors (Caetano de Souza 2008, 1860). An 
attempt at working between the two perspectives is represented by Brown and 




a measure of value called EMergy (energy memory); a quantitative analysis of how best 
to manage resources, populations and regional economies was included (Brown and 
McClanahan 1995). While their analysis of dam proposals was novel in that they 
attempted to account for economic and social variables in hydropower development in 
addition to traditional physical variables such as rainfall and sediment levels through a 
quantitative analysis, the methods and technical ability needed to fully understand 
EMergy are fairly complicated and may result in some confusion over how exactly 
estimations are made. 
The environmental/hydropower potential research tends to focus on specific 
scales which may hide processes and effects that are working across scales. For example, 
Altinbilek (2002) is focused primarily on the national level when attempting to account 
for the role of dams in Turkey’s development, citing the contributions to Turkey’s 
economy and how hydropower in general is a renewable natural resource (Altinbilek 
2002, 11). Altinbilek recognizes that controversy exists over dam construction, but 
confines his analysis on the effects at the national scale, which does not account for 
potential protests and issues that may arise at both the international and local scales, 
which could possibly derail development schemes and force a new strategy and pattern of 
development. 
 Those concerned with the social aspects focus on such concerns as migration and 
resettlement, land loss and equitable use agreements (Brown et al. 2008, Li 2002, 
Parveen and Faisal 2002, Sneddon and Fox 2006, Tilt et al. 2009). Research in this area is 
also multi-disciplined resulting in specific focuses by discipline. An exception to this is a 




management, Steinberg and Clark discuss the inherent conflict of social power and 
environmental transformations which require crossing scales in order to fully understand 
the conflict present. Research taking the populist perspective of resource conflict states 
that there is an inherent division between ‘us’/local and ‘them’/urban/higher levels.  ‘Us' 
is portrayed being ecologically holistic, small-scale, and sustainable, while ‘them’ is the 
complete opposite (Steinberg and Clark 1999, 479). While this narrative may accurately 
depict development situations in some cases, this view may be incomplete. The 
relationship between development and the environment will not be harmonious at all 
times, yet not a zero-sum game (Steinberg and Clark 1999, 482).  
 Resettlement and livelihood disruption is perhaps one of the most controversial 
issues concerning hydropower development. The social effects of displacement include 
landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, food insecurity community disarticulation, 
increased morbidity, loss of community resources, and depression among displaced 
residents (Brown 2008, 621). Tilt et al. (2009) using the tool of social impact analysis 
found that large scale dam projects in general result in the disruption of rural economies 
and livelihoods through the loss of water resources, loss of agricultural sources, and 
forests for building purposes. Additionally, resentment and distrust of business and 
government is fostered as a result of poor compensation policies and the inability to 
rebuild after resettlement. 
 The influence of NGO’s who tend to focus their efforts on smaller, local, village 
scales is also noted by their contribution to the debate on the issues of hydropower. 
NGO’s have made a large contribution to detailing the socio-economic issues and effects 




(IRN 2011), has periodically published reports on various hydropower and dam building 
projects. IRN's (2008b) report on the impact of rapid dam development in Laos is focused 
heavily on the effects of hydropower development at the local level. Multiple case studies 
within this report of past, present, and future projects constantly discuss the impacts on 
local villages, livelihoods, and resettlement. Overall, the report is critical on most actions 
taken by the government of Laos, developers, and international government 
organizations, for what they perceive as failures to the people who are affected by these 
projects. Reports like this offer a localized perspective, for a region that has not been 
studied as extensively as in other literature. Yet, they suffer from the biases of the 
organization and elements of the ‘territorial trap’ of scale in that they fail to recognize the 
interaction of perceptions, actions, and effects, at their scale of focus and across different 
scales.  Reports like this also have a tendency to romanticize rural life and ties to the land 
(Steinberg and Clark 1999, 479). An example is found within several case studies of the 
Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project in Laos. These reports conclude that many people in 
the area of the dam will be or have been affected in relative terms. Additionally they 
emphasize the loss of traditions and culture as well as their deep rooted connections to 
the land. Yet there is little or no mention of what benefits the project has brought in 
absolute terms, or on the provincial, regional, national, or international level (FIVAS 
2007, IRN 2008b, 2009). Here we see disconnect in the perception of hydropower by the 
focus on localized, relative costs, forgetting that these hydropower projects do provide 
benefits, just not at the level of concern for the party involved. 
 Principles of equitable use are another aspect that concerns hydropower. 




equitable usage and its corollaries of prior consultation and notification are a major point 
of contention in hydropower projects (Sneddon and Fox 2006, 190). These principles, 
however, are often couched in terms of the national rather than local. For example, many 
affected peoples are merely informed of the project, having very little recourse, while the 
concept of prior consultation is meant between nation-states. Research on trans-boundary 
waters focuses on the question of who is in control of the water in terms of policies and 
decision, and what the effects are as a result of development. Sneddon and Fox’s (2006) 
analysis of the Mekong river basin notes that cooperation is not the goal of governments, 
but merely a tool in the development of basins. Similarly Brichieri-Colombi and 
Bradnock (2003) find that questions of rights of usage become central in trans-boundary 
water policies as well as issues of competitive resource extraction versus cooperative 
development policies. Most of the issues and questions brought up by these authors are 
primarily ones of the national and international scales that have little interaction with 
lower scales. Solutions to problems framed at the national and international scale reflect 
actors operating at that scale, but solutions made at the international scale will not 
necessarily solve remaining problems at smaller scales (Giordano 2003, 368). 
 Research from those concerned with the environmental effects and hydropower 
potential, and those concerned with the social issues offer valuable information about the 
effects of hydropower development. Yet there is little discussion on how these factors 
have affected patterns of development. It can be surmised that there is a relationship of 
some kind between patterns and effects, quite possibly with a feedback loop being 
present. What is not clear is what these patterns are and how key elements of hydropower 





The physical and social impacts of hydropower are also connected to economic 
effects which in turn are linked to the pattern of hydropower development. Hydropower 
and economics are inherently connected through issues of financing, monetary benefits; 
power sales agreements, and international economic relations (Banfi et al. 2005, Gilpin 
1987, Li 2002, McDonald et al. 2009, Virtanen 2006). A primary motive for hydropower 
development is economic development, growth, and stability. Virtanen (2006) details 
how hydropower development is part of Laos’s goal of exiting the group of least 
developed countries by 2020. Large scale hydropower projects are considered one of the 
few available alternatives for attracting investment and gaining export earnings, given the 
country’s resources (Virtanen 2006, 183). Li’s (2002) analysis of the Chinese 
hydropower sector shows that the building of hydropower projects has enabled China the 
means to pay for irrigation, flood control, and water supply projects (Li 2002, 1248). On 
a regional scale, Li notes that via export of surplus energy, additional income for regional 
development can be utilized. In general, hydropower development, like other 
development projects can help states escape geographic disadvantages that have 
hampered growth and development such as poor terrain, being landlocked, and lack of 
profitable non-renewable resources (Przeworski 2004, Sachs et al. 2000, Woods 2004). 
 The role of international development and multilateral funding institutions such as 
the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are a consistent feature in the literature 
as these organizations have provided large amounts of the funding for the construction of 
hydropower projects (Hirsch 2010, Li 2002). These organizations in general cite their 




meant for development and realization of national goals such as poverty reduction. 
Additionally, Virtanen (2006) finds that foreign direct investment is critical to the 
financing of such projects, as well as being extremely dependent upon outside sources, 
whether it is for financing or technical expertise. What is less clear at times is how these 
institutions view hydropower development, and how that has affected their actions, for 
example in terms of negotiation and distribution of funds for hydropower development. 
This raises a question of not only if international institutions have been able to 
significantly influence hydropower development patterns, but what consequences have 
resulted as well. These sources of external funding are critical, as they can add additional 
requirements in the development process, such as a social impact analysis, increased 
oversight, and stricter environmental guidelines in the building process which may 
suggest supremacy of roles for international funding institutions.  
 The literature on economic development and funding sources raises the issue of 
economic dependence. Countries that wish to develop their hydropower resources may be 
completely dependent upon the industrialized nations for funding and technological 
expertise. Possibly, there is a degree of autonomy that countries rich with hydropower 
potential have in terms of being the owner of the resource in question. Dependency 
theory in general suggests that the rich states of the world system use economic forms of 
control, in essence informal control most often found in the multinational corporations of 
the world, to further their own gains, as well as keep subordinate states in their place 
(Gilpin 1987, 284). McDonald et al. (2009) touch upon the idea of dependence in their 
paper on the exporting of Chinese hydropower technology. China appears to be offering 




hydropower. Yet this is not completely altruistic. As McDonald et al. describe, while 
China is offering assistance in the form of loans and technological advice, this may also 
serve as quid pro quo for the rights to resource extraction, which China has had a 
growing need of in the past ten years (McDonald et al. 2009, S297).        
Overall, economics’ focus on a broad, national level draws attention away from 
more regional and local levels of economic concern in relation to hydropower 
development. This is where NGO’s tend to pick up in that they focus on the economic 
costs at lower levels of analysis. Yet there still is a divorce between the levels, with 
neither quite recognizing costs nor benefits at different scales and levels. This disconnect 
has helped to exacerbate debates in the political arena as well. 
Political and Planning Aspects 
 The hydropower sector’s interactions with politics have also been examined in 
various contexts and at various scales. Sharing concerns with those working in the social 
realm and those concerned with the economic impacts, work in this field has examined 
the role politics plays in the hydropower sector and how the sector itself has political 
implications. In very general terms, concerns over the decision making process, planning, 
public participation, equitable usage, and the role of the external political environment 
have been the focus of research for those concerned with the political aspects of 
hydropower. Morrill’s (1999a, 1999b) analysis of decision making concerning natural 
resources does not specifically address hydropower, but is still helpful in understanding 
the decision making process with concern to natural resources. Essentially, Morrill is 
concerned about the distribution of power and outcomes across geographic scales which 




reasons for the supremacy of higher levels such as interdependence, dependence, and 
power, Morrill notes the competing claims of governments needing to acquit the needs 
and desires of business and households, the two foundations of modern society. However, 
the use of the Hanford case study raises questions of generalizability to other cases as the 
role of the federal system of the United States plays a large part in setting the context of 
inter-scale relations, such as the perception of limited autonomy at the local level (Morrill 
3, 1999). These concerns were addressed by Fainstein (1999), Martin (1999), and 
Swanstrom (1999) who question the findings of Morrill. Notably, Swanstrom is highly 
critical of what he perceives as Morrill’s bias for leaving land use decisions in the hands 
of local powers, which may create local dependence relations between the rich and poor 
of an area (Swanstrom 1999, 31). Here we see a divide on where decision making should 
take place, whether on the state or local level which can have an effect on the overall 
patterns present. All of these analyses are couched within the context of the U.S. federal 
system, which is significantly different than authoritarian and socialist regimes where 
much of the hydropower sector’s activities are taking place. It is unclear whether these 
findings on the decision making process hold in a different government context. 
 Other political concerns have also contributed to debates about the planning, 
control, and usage of resources, specifically rivers, which are the critical component of 
hydropower. Related to the principle of equitable use as mentioned before, the literature 
has focused on trans-boundary water systems in relation to dam development, and how 
rivers are viewed in relation to policies of development (Baghel and Nüsser 2010, Bakker 
1999, Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock 2003, D’Souza 2004, Furlong 2006, Sneddon and 




critical to understanding not only patterns, but the effects that development can have 
upon a state and its people. Political control of the resource is a vital aspect of 
hydropower and in general as it may provide an important source of political patronage 
and punish opponents in the broader struggle for political power (Bakker 1999, 226, 
Barney 2007). For Mollinga (2010), the nation-state is the primary level of control, with 
states assuming ownership of water resources and governing and management at the 
national level (Mollinga 2010, 514).  
Governments have viewed rivers, specifically trans-boundary river basins, as 
important engines of regional economic development; bases of livelihood resources; and 
critical sites of biodiversity conservation. These competing roles make governance of 
rivers a particularly challenging endeavor (Sneddon and Fox 2000, 182). National and 
local level concerns are at the center of many disputes that center around hydropower. 
Through framing involvement and development as efficient, creating jobs, the rights of 
the many over the few, and advocating the precedence of more economically productive 
and socially beneficial uses of resources, the government and higher level justifications 
of development are very powerful (Steinberg and Clark 1999, 479). Unfortunately 
agreements and institutions created in the political realm to deal with conflicts of usage 
and control are in stark contrast to the physical realities of nature (Sneddon and Fox 
2000). A state cannot simply move a river it claims as its own to a location within its 
borders in order to develop as it pleases.  
As rivers and dam projects are important parts of development agendas for many 
states in the post Cold-War era, increasing scrutiny on how governments handle such 




commodity, which encompasses territory different from political boundaries of the state, 
including resident populations who are affected by this development (D’Souza 2004, 
704). The view of rivers as a commodity is reinforced by Bakker (1999) in her analysis of 
hydropower development on the Mekong River. Her analysis used as a starting point the 
assumption that the Mekong is an immensely valuable resource that is almost completely 
uncommodified, and that the Mekong River has been transformed from a Cold War 
frontline to a corridor of commerce (Bakker 1999, 209). Hydropower development at any 
scale will operate as a means for commodification, and as an extension of state control 
into largely rural areas (Bakker 1999, 212). In this sense rivers are seen as both a resource 
for income as well as an extension of state control.  
 Political control of rivers and hydropower resources has also entailed discussions 
on the role of democracy. D’Souza (2004) focuses on the dynamics of democratic 
development, which in itself is an oxymoron, comprising two very different ideas; 
democracy; entailing devolution of power to nations and communities within nations, and 
development, which entails conceding power to global economic institutions, public and 
private (D’Souza 2004, 702). Further, western assumptions on the role of democracy and 
the concept of an authoritarian state have influenced water policy analysis. Mollinga 
(2010) describes how existing policy analysis frameworks have used assumptions about 
the liberal parliamentary democratic state form, notably assumptions on the power and 
independence of electoral voting, and the presence of civil society organizations engaging 
in the policy process and upholding the rule of law (Mollinga 2010, 512). The normative 
aspect of western policy analysis may not be suitable where these assumptions do not 





 An area where the literature has found a new focus is in the area of geopolitics. 
This also has become a new scale of analysis in the debates concerning hydropower at the 
international level, with concern ranging from international water law to issues of 
cooperative development. Beeson’s (2009) study of regionalism in East Asia draws ideas 
from economic geography, noting that political science has felt ambivalent to hostile 
about the utility of geopolitics. While not directly concerned about hydropower, Beeson’s 
study shows the importance that historical, strategic, and material contexts play in the 
impact of influences that concern geopolitics (Beeson 2009, 500). Water disputes are a 
common element in geopolitical studies. Emmers (2010) comes closer to the hydropower 
sector in his analysis of East Asian maritime disputes. Despite being focused on offshore 
water disputes, Emmers uses a framework consisting of three parts that are 
interconnected: territory, natural resources, and power, which all interact in the realm of 
geopolitics (Emmers 2010, 17). This triangular relationship is exemplified via the 
concern of the energy considerations of a state, whether an area is important for its 
energy reserves. This may lead to territorial and sovereignty considerations of a region, 
which raises questions of power relations and symmetry (Emmers 2010, 18). Again, 
while not specifically dealing with the hydropower sector, Emmers’ framework of 
territory, natural resources, and power is relevant in the discussion of the role of 
hydropower on an international and regional scale. When water flows across political 
boundaries in trans-boundary water systems, nation-states are the primary participants in 




being paid on how hydropower development may affect a region’s geopolitical situation 
and how geopolitics affects hydropower development. 
 Work specifically dealing with the geopolitical dynamics of hydropower 
development and the sector itself is focused upon relations between riparian states, and 
the universal effects of dam development, in terms of social, economic, and political 
effects. and how a state’s geopolitical position may be improved via dam building 
(Baghel and Nüsser 2010). Southeast Asia and Laos in particular are of interest as this 
region was a frontline during the Cold War and the site of numerous violent conflicts in 
the past fifty years, which has prevented and stalled much development in the region. 
Hydropower itself is a peacetime resource, that only during peace is the potential for 
development fully realized (Bakker 1999). Geopolitically, the idea of dams as bargaining 
tools is also recognized. McDonald et al. (2009) note this fact prominently in the case of 
China, which has a market advantage in dam building, combined with favorable 
government policies which allow the export of dam building as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations. As previously mentioned, while China touts this export of knowledge and 
technology as “no strings attached,” the possibility of the expectation of reciprocation 
remains a looming factor for many of the African and South East Asian nations that have 
benefited from China’s hydropower knowledge.    
 The potential for geopolitical conflict is another issue that hydropower is 
connected with. Many river systems in the world transcend national boundaries, or create 
borders for states. The “water war” hypothesis of interstate conflict states that when a 
river shares a common boundary or there are downstream and upstream parties involved, 




quantity (Toset et al. 2000). Hydropower development on shared river systems may 
exacerbate regional and national tensions, perhaps even to the point of armed conflict. 
Toset et al’s (2000) study of shared rivers and interstate conflict used new data on rivers 
that they correlated with the Correlates of War data by Singer and Small (1994) to 
examine whether shared rivers resulted in increased conflict. Their analysis did not 
specifically address the role hydropower development may have, but indirect references 
to scarcity and quality issues relate to many debates about the physical effects dam 
building can have. This study did not find significant systematic evidence of rivers being 
the primary factor in conflicts, but they still believe that rivers may increase conflict. 
Hydropower development on trans-boundary water systems involves by its nature all of 
the states that have some manner of control of the resource. The possibility of 
cooperative arrangements between states is always a possibility; however, conflict is also 
another choice open to states in their handling of geopolitical resource issues.  
Geopolitical conflict may also be found within states at the provincial level in terms of 
the distribution of positive effects, as well as negative ones. 
  As mentioned before, many disputes over hydropower concern national versus 
local interests, especially in terms of absolute and relative benefits. Another way of 
diffusing geopolitical hydro-conflict has been to change the scale of focus (Sneddon and 
Fox 2000). By utilizing a different scale for geopolitical objectives, such as the 
construction of a dam to increase wealth, industry, and building a prosperous region, 
criticism can be mitigated through a shift in scales. Framing the project in a national scale 




that may be present at the local level. In contrast, shifting down in scale can bring 
attention to those who would otherwise be minimized by a shift up in scale. 
 Perhaps most importantly, an analysis of hydropower’s relationship with 
geopolitics must take into account context (Hirsch 2010, Mollinga 2010). Context can 
take many forms from local, national and international to historical. Even with context 
having an influence there is still room for comparison. Future hydropower development 
according to several scholars should take account of geopolitical implications and dam 
building within the context of a regions geopolitical history (Mollinga 2010, Parveen and 
Faisal 2002). Lastly, while much of the literature has focused on the effects of 
hydropower development, more attention should be paid to the causes as well, which 
include geopolitical effects (Baghel and Nüsser 2010, 242). 
Conclusion 
 The issues detailed in this literature review are certainly important to consider and 
understand when attempting to explain any aspect of hydropower development in 
general, including the patterns of development, given the Laotian context. Much of the 
literature has focused upon the effects of hydropower, with less concerning the actual 
causes of development and the patterns present. Additionally, a feedback loop may exist 
as a result of the effects of hydropower development upon subsequent patterns. In order 
to analyze patterns and effects, there must be a recognition that the hydropower 
development process does not simply operate at one specific scale in terms of processes, 
and level of analysis. While focusing on one specific level is beneficial in many studies, 
an analysis like I am conducting requires examining how processes and actions operate 




study of watershed management which advocated a middle ground between populism and 
utopianism when interpreting environment-development conflict. This study examined 
views and perspectives from both an urban and local level and compiled them into a 
holistic analysis that attempted to offer a more balanced viewpoint on development 
conflicts. As this is also a multi-discipline approach, the need for an analysis at multiple 
levels and scales is even more critical. Only through a multi-level analysis can the 












 As stated in previous chapters, the goal of this research is to study the Laotian 
hydropower sector and provide a broad picture of hydropower development in the past 20 
years, and provide an analysis of future prospects. I seek to explain several things: what 
patterns are present in the past two decades; what changes have occurred during this time 
period; and what influences said patterns again during this period, and lastly what 
consequences have resulted. Next I provide an analysis of the consequences of 
hydropower development in the past 20 years. Analysis of various reports, statistics, and 
accounts from multiple sources will allow for in-depth comparison and discussion on 
these issues. Finally I address the future of Laotian hydropower development in terms of 
prospects and constraints, as related to the pace, scale, efficiency, equitability, and 
sustainability of development. 
General Methods  
In order to examine how patterns have changed, as well as speculate on their 
future in terms of hydropower development, a mixed method approach of geographic 
visualization, descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, and qualitative 
document analysis of secondary data is used in this research. These methods are well 
suited to the large amount of secondary data that is available and utilized for this study. 




the time periods of focus. A mixed method approach does not simply use qualitative and 
quantitative data to answer research questions. Instead, it integrates both qualitative and 
quantitative methods into data collection, analysis, and discussion that set it apart from 
other methodologies. Additionally it allows two other goals in research. First is the ability 
to ask questions that could not be asked if only one method were used. Statistical analysis 
may tell how much something has changed, but what influences are present cannot 
simply be derived through pure statistics. Second is to look for inconsistencies in the 
partial knowledge produced by different techniques and treat them as opportunities for 
further research (Rood 2010).  
Geographic visualization is the usage of visual representations to make spatial 
patterns and problems visible (St. Martin and Pavlovskya 2010). In this study geographic 
visualization allows the spatial pattern of Laotian hydropower development to be visually 
seen. Utilizing geographic information systems (GIS) to produce visual representations 
(maps) of the general location of major Laotian hydropower projects, spatial patterns can 
be visualized.  
The usage of descriptive statistical analysis provides insight and allows for 
analysis of the trends and patterns that are present in past 20 years of Laotian hydropower 
development. Through a comparison of specific descriptive statistics such as amount of 
hydropower produced and the amount of export revenue, statistical analysis can garner 
insight to how patterns have changed the during this time period and the magnitude of 
change.  
Data for statistical analysis is from a variety of sources and deals with a variety of 




production for instance are a key indicator of patters of development. Statistics of 
economic growth and health are compared to levels of production in order to determine 
whether economic growth and hydropower production are actually related, as posited by 
the proponents of hydropower. Other statistics deal with some of the consequences of 
hydropower development. Statistics from the UN on the levels of agricultural and food 
production are indicators of whether hydropower development has caused decreases in 
said levels due to loss of land via flooding and land acquisition.    
 Qualitative document analysis serves the purpose of processing data that is not 
available or feasible to work with in quantitative forms. Document analysis as a method 
entails the collection, review, interrogation, and analysis of various forms of text as a 
primary source of research data (O’Leary 2004, 177). As O’Leary (2004) notes, 
document analysis involves both examining the credibility of documents, as well as the 
exploration of the ‘witting’ evidence or the contents within the document (180). 
Document analysis is used to extract backgrounds, positions, stances, justifications, and 
consequences of hydropower development in relation to development patterns over the 
past 20 years from documents pertaining to hydropower.  By extracting these elements, it 
becomes possible to analyze how the factors listed above have either promoted or 
hindered hydropower development in the time period specified.  
 Numerous documents that pertain to hydropower are utilized in this study to 
provide data in the form of descriptions, viewpoints, and perspectives that cannot be 
garnered from pure statistical analysis. Document analysis of developer reports, 
government reports, laws, and policies help show the processes and rationale behind 




NGO’s, academics, and other international organizations reveals other viewpoints of 
hydropower development that focus on the consequences, both negative and positive of 
development. Through document analysis, I am able to overcome the deficiencies and 
lack of in some cases, of quantitative data for this study.   
Framework 
 The analysis of Laotian hydropower patterns utilizes aspects of the framework 
found in PEST (Political, Economic, Social, and Technological) analysis. PEST analyses, 
also known as PESTEL (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and 
Legal) are used as an analysis framework of macro-environmental factors to analyze 
multiple factors influencing either the position of a particular organization or particular 
sector (Gillespie 2010). PEST analysis can also be used to analyze the viability of general 
management solutions in a business environment. The usefulness of PEST relies upon the 
assumption that the success of an organization or solution cannot be understood without 
having the information relevant to the specific operation environment (Peng and Nunes 
2007, 230). Without the relevant information, any conclusions or solutions drawn from 
the analysis will be deficient by not taking into account as many specific factors as 
possible. PEST classification is broken down into various factors that are known to affect 
macro-environmental decisions by businesses. In this analysis, the political, economic, 
social, environmental, and legal factors are examined in relation to their relationship to 
hydropower development patterns in Laos, in both causes and consequences.  
 I utilize a modified variant of this framework, essentially a PESL (Political, 
Economic, Social, and Legal) analysis to examine the influences as well as identify 




specific factors that are relevant to the development of the hydropower sector. Specific 
political factors include the Laotian political system and the regional geopolitical 
situation. Economic factors consist of the strength of the hydropower market, levels of 
hydropower revenue, and the contribution of hydropower revenue to the Laotian 
economy. Specific social factors include mitigation and resettlement measures, and 
measurements of socio-economic variables as related to food, agriculture, and health. 
Lastly, the legal factors include the role specific pieces of government policy have had 
upon the promotion of the hydropower sector. 
When working with a PEST framework it is important to consider the level at 
which it is applied (Gillespie 2010). For example in relation to economic factors, one 
needs to realize that there are effects at multiple scales when dealing with hydropower 
development. At the local level, there needs to be a consideration of loss of income due to 
loss of land in the creation of hydropower reservoirs. At the national and international 
level there needs to be consideration of national macroeconomic status and power trade 
markets respectively when analyzing both the causes and consequences of hydropower 
development patterns. An analysis under the umbrella of a PEST framework is valuable 
in that it helps develop an in-depth understanding of the contexts present when analyzing 
a specific sector and country.  
The PEST framework and analysis however has faults, it can be imprecise and 
primarily that it can allow an almost unlimited number of variables to emerge from each 
dimension (Gillespie 2010, Peng and Nunes 2007). This must be compensated for by 
thinking about which factors are most likely to change and which ones will have the 




specify which elements from each realm (economic, political, etc.) are important in 
relation to hydropower development patterns which help narrow the context of the study. 
Specific Methods and Data 
 In order to describe patterns present in hydropower development in Laos as well 
as analyze influences, consequences, and future development, data from a variety of 
sources is used to answer the questions at hand. Much of this data comes from Laotian 
government and developer documents. Other data is provided by international 
organizations such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the United 
Nations, who keep databases of statistics and documents related to hydropower 
development and its effects. Specific data dealing with patterns, factors of development, 
and consequences requires specific methods used and answers different aspects of the 
research goals. The specific data and associated methods are discussed below. Analysis 
of the data is undertaken under a variant of the PEST analysis. 
Hydropower Development Patterns 
To describe and explain initially what patterns are present in terms of hydropower 
development, descriptive statistical analysis and spatial visualization are the primary 
methods used. Hydropower development in this study is measured in terms of 
hydroelectric production and quantity of projects during the time periods of focus. 
Electricité du Laos, the state owned electric corporation produces a list of planned, under 
construction, and operational hydropower projects on an irregular basis, the most recent 
being in July 2011 (EdL 2011). The list includes: operational date of project (if 
available), province location, and capacity of the project (Mw). These statistics were then 




the number of projects operational/under construction/planned in a given year. Statistics 
from this database are also integrated into ArcGIS in order to map the spatial distribution 
of Laotian hydropower projects.  
Summary statistics including the total amounts of electricity produced (Billion 
Kw), and net generation of hydroelectricity (Billion Kw). These are used to determine 
how much total electricity is produced by Laos, and what share of that is due to 
hydroelectricity. This information along with data on the total amount of electricity 
exported (Billion Kw), and total installed capacity come from the U.S. Department of 
Energy Information Administration from 1990 to 2008. This database serves as the most 
complete archive on certain measures of electricity production as direct data from Laos is 
either unavailable or non-existent. This data, both statistic and spatial helps to describe 
patterns specific not only in overall production, but spatial as well which may suggest 
more subtle influences geographically and in the macro-environment.  
  Electricity export revenue is the primary indicator of hydropower profitability. 
Exact statistics for Laotian hydropower revenue are not readily available which requires 
an estimation of these amounts for the past two decades. Utilizing a base rate established 
by the Electricité du Laos in 2007, a rough estimate for each year of the study period is 
calculated by multiplying the base rate by the amount of exported electricity for each 
year.  
Foreign direct investment is an additional factor that is considered in relation to 
hydropower development as both an enabler and a measurement of hydropower 





Contributing Factors to Hydropower Development Patterns 
In order to analyze contributing effects of economics, government policy, and 
geopolitics, document analysis of secondary data is utilized, as much of the information 
that discusses contributions is in the form of documents produced by various sources 
including: official Lao government reports, Asian Development Bank and World Bank 
reports and briefs, reports by NGO’s and academics. Document analysis serves several 
purposes including: providing information on how hydropower is supported via political 
actions, regional views and positions of increased hydropower construction and 
development, and lastly providing a picture of current constraints facing hydropower 
development by Laos. 
Consequences of Development 
Several methods including descriptive statistical analysis and document analysis 
are utilized to describe the consequences of hydropower development. Again, these 
methods are utilized as they work well with secondary data. Several indicators of socio-
economic statuses as indicated in various literatures are analyzed in relation to the 
measurements of hydropower development as well. Due to data limitations in the form of 
a lack of annual data for a multitude of indicators, several proxies of secondary socio-
economic data must be utilized. As noted by Brown et al. (2008), Tilt et al. (2009), and 
IRN (2008b), food insecurity and agricultural production are two primary concerns 
related to hydropower development. These are reflected in the usage of agricultural 





To examine other socio-economic justifications of hydropower development and 
how they are affected by patterns of development, several proxies are used. Data on 
health expenditures per capita (U.S. $), infant mortality rate, and life expectancy, serve as 
reasonable proxy variables of poverty indicators. This data comes from both the World 
Bank (2011b) and the World Health Organization (2011) for 1990-2009, and 1995-2009, 
depending on data availability.  
Documents concerning the issues of mitigation, resettlement, and compensation 
plans and policies are analyzed in relation to the patterns of development in order to 
determine the consequences of increased hydropower development. These documents are 
in the form of reports put out by various agencies and organizations representing a wide 
variety of interests, ranging from donors and multilateral organizations (ADB 2002, 
2004b, 2010b, World Bank 2010b) to project developers (NTPC 2008, World Bank 
1998), and critics of hydropower development (Barney 2007, EDF 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 
FIVAS 2007, IRN 2008b).  
In order to describe geopolitical consequences of hydropower development, 
media reports discussing dam projects and development along the Mekong River are 






HYDDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN LAOS: ACHIEVEMENTS, 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPACTS 
 
Introduction 
 The hydropower sector in Laos in the last 20 years experienced two stages of 
development. The first is that of stagnant development with little change, while the 
second is a picture of rapid growth which seems to have no limit. In order to analyze 
explain the pattern of development; this chapter is broken down into several parts. First in 
order to establish a geographic, historical, and political context, a short section detailing 
the backgrounds of each of these contexts is given. Next an analysis of Laotian 
hydropower patterns is conducted. This chapter is meant to examine the measurements of 
hydropower development described in the previous chapter. These measurements are 
analyzed and discussed individually. Following the analysis of the patterns present, the 
next sections analyze contributing factors, and the consequences of hydropower 
development in relation to the key factors. I conclude this chapter with a short summary 
of the major effects upon the patterns of development in relation to the key factors. Lastly 
in the conclusion, I present a sedge way to a discussion of future trends and patterns as 





 Laos is a landlocked state covering 236,000 square kilometers in the center of the 
Southeast Asian peninsula. Figure 1 shows Laos’ position in Southeast Asia as several 
major bodies of water present in the form of rivers and lakes while Figure 2 shows the 
provinces of Laos. As evident from Figure 1, one of the most prominent physical features 
of Laos is the Mekong River that after entering the country from Myanmar generally 
follows the western boundary of Laos. Figure 1 also displays several prominent rivers 
that have seen or have plans for hydropower development. 
Surrounded by Myanmar and China to the north, Thailand and Cambodia in the 
west and south, and Vietnam to the east, Laos' location has made it a buffer state between 
its more powerful neighbors as well as a crossroads for trade and communication (Savada 
1994, 81). A mountainous region that is characterized by steep terrain, narrow river 
valleys, and low agricultural potential, Laos' physical geography presents a heavy 
obstacle to development in terms of agriculture, transportation, and infrastructure 
development. Roughly only 4% of the total land area is considered arable (Savada 1994, 
82). Laos’ total renewable water resources are measured at 333.6 km
3
 with a total 
freshwater withdrawal rate of 3 km
3
 (The World Factbook 2011). Combined with a 
tropical monsoon climate and dry seasons, irrigation is a major concern. Regional 
rainfalls can vary with the highest amounts in the area of 3700 millimeters annually. 
Regional droughts are a concern for rice cultivation which is a primary staple for the 
people of Laos. Average temperatures range from a minimum of 25°C to a maximum of 
38°C. The northern part of the country is prone to droughts, while the central and 

















general lack of development, the road networks in Laos are few and unreliable, limiting 
government presence in areas distant from the national capital (Savada 1995, 85). As of 
2007, Laos had only 36,831 km of roadways, placing it 92
nd
 in the world (The World 
Factbook, 2011).Laos is home to several natural resources. Timber, hydropower, gypsum, 
tin, gold, and gemstones are all found within Laos, with hydropower and timber reserves 
being the most important resources for profit (The World Factbook, 2011). The physical 
geography of Laos with its abundance of rivers and mountains provides the country with 
significant hydropower potential which has been highly undeveloped at this point. 
Hydropower is thus seen as playing a pivotal role in the present and future development 
of Laos through the funding of the national development framework which has been a 
part of Laos' National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy. Climate change is also a 
concern in Laos in relation to natural resources in terms of effects to agriculture, energy, 
and forestry. The United Nations Development Programme has attempted to raise 
awareness of the impacts of global climate change upon Laos’ natural resource base. The 
UNDP has recognized that Laos is highly dependent upon natural resources for economic 
and social development. Changing climate and weather patterns can result in severe 
environmental degradation and natural disasters that have the potential to destroy 
livelihoods and hinder development (UNDP 2008, 6). Data on current climate change 
effects in Laos is sparse, but reports of increased floods and droughts suggest that 
combined with hydropower development, climate change may be having an adverse 






Historical Hydropower Development 
While Laos’ hydropower production potential was recognized as early as the post 
World War II period, it was not until the late 1960’s that development of hydropower 
resources begun in Laos. The first large scale hydropower project in Laos was the Nam 
Ngum 1 project. Nam Ngum 1 with a total capacity of 150 Mw, was designed originally 
to provide power for domestic industry as well as provide for exports and domestic 
demand (ADB 2002, 2-3). Constructed in the late 1960’s and becoming operational in 
1971, Nam Ngum 1 today is considered to be a highly effective development project, 
offering a wide range of benefits to the country (ADB 2002, 2-17). Nam Ngum1 was 
largely conceived and implemented with coordination by the Mekong Committee, with 
the national power agency taking over responsibility during the post construction period. 
While at the time the dam was considered a stand-alone project, today Nam Ngum 1 is 
seen as a component of the wider development of water resources in the basin as well as 
being part of the national growth and development plans (ADB 2002, 2-2).  
Geopolitics during this time helped to discourage further development in the 
1970’s. Laos was entangled in the Second Indochina War through the Pathet Lao, the 
communist element within Laos. Following the communist victory in Vietnam in 1975, 
and with support from North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao became the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic in March of 1975 (Savada 1995, 68). Further large-scale 
development was halted and the Mekong Committee disbanded with the Second 
Indochina War and the communist victory in Vietnam in 1975. Regional hydropower 
development has ebbed and flowed with broader events and ideologies. For example, 




Thailand during the Cold War period as barrier to communism through regional 
development (Hirsch 2010). Support for hydro-projects continued with the spread of 
communist governments in Southeast Asia, but was hampered by a lack of resources, 
planning, and most importantly funding. 
 Major hydropower development was stalled throughout the 1980’s due to war and 
political instability (IRN 2008b, 13). Political isolation also played a part in the lack of 
development during the 1980’s. This is a historical example of how politics under the 
PESL framework have influenced the development of hydropower. Limited amounts of 
foreign aid and limited government revenue resources contributed to a lack of investment 
in infrastructure and revenue projects such as hydropower (ADB 2002, 2-17). With the 
end of the Cold War in the early 1990’s combined with regional rapprochement between 
non-communist Thailand and its communist neighbors, interest in hydropower once again 
grew. Thailand was seeking outside sources for electricity, while Laos sought to gain 
revenue from the sale of its natural resources in the region (Hirsch 2010, 314).  
The 1990’s represented rejuvenation in Laotian hydropower with multiple 
memoranda’s of understanding signed with Thailand and Vietnam for the purchase of 
electricity, resulting in the planning of multiple hydropower projects to increase 
hydropower capacity (IRN 2008b, 13). The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis however helped 
to put a damper on the revival of hydropower in the region. Economic growth was slowed 
throughout Southeast Asia especially in Thailand where the crisis started and had affected 
the most. Thai energy demand had been one of the key driving forces behind the push for 
Laotian hydropower which became stalled due to lack of demand and emerging problems 




public institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and World Bank (Hirsch 2010, 
314). Economic recovery following the financial crisis combined with increased demand 
for electricity in both Thailand and Vietnam in the new millennium has resulted in a new 
hydropower boom. Memorandums of understanding were signed with both Thailand and 
Vietnam for the purchase of 7000 Mw and 3000 Mw of electricity respectively (IRN 
2008b, 13). Hydropower projects have also found support from international funding 
groups such as the Asian Development Bank and World Bank who have contributed 
significant financial support for hydropower projects. In the Nam Theun 2 project which 
became operational in 2010, the World Bank provided a 20 million dollar (U.S.) grant 
and risk guarantees of over 42 million dollars (World Bank 2009, 4). The Asian 
Development Bank provided 120 million dollars in the form of loans and guarantees in 
support of the project (ADB 2010b). Overall Asian Development Bank assistance to Laos 
for the development of the energy sector totaled approximately 290 million dollars from 
1988 to 2009 (ADB 2011a). 
Development and Achievements – 1990-2009 
 Laotian hydropower development can roughly be divided into two distinct time 
periods; pre-1998 development, and post-1998 development. This distinction is made due 
to the large increases in hydropower production and investment starting in 1998. 1998 
also marks the start of operation for the Theun-Hinboun hydropower project, which was 
the first major project since the 1970's. Starting with the measurements of total energy 
generated, total hydropower generated, and total amount exported, certain trends in the 





Production Levels and Project Numbers 
 
Figure 3. Laotian electricity production, exports, and imports – 1990-2008 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011 
 
 As can be seen in Figure 3, until about 1997, total energy generation as well as 
hydropower generation hovered around 1 billion Kw hours annually, while exports stayed 
constant at around 500,000 to 700,000 Kw hours. Despite the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997 when energy demand regionally plummeted, hydropower generation and net 
generation saw major increases in the next 4 years. Increases and declines in export 
amounts closely mirrored the total net generation. A period of brief decline in generation 
is found from 2001 to 2003 for both hydropower generation and net generation, rising 
again in 2004. Another period of decline is also present from 2008 to 2009. Interestingly 
total electricity exports after reaching a peak in 1999 have experienced patterns of muted 




amount of electricity imported by Thailand, one of Laos’ primary customers for its 
hydroelectricity production as well as competition from alternative sources of energy 
such as coal and natural gas, which Thailand imports for the production of electricity 
(Maunsell 2004, 50). 
 This pattern of increased generation and decreasing exports is both interesting and 
surprising given the emphasis hydropower production has had in multiple contexts as 
related to Laos. As an example of this emphasis, Electricité du Laos (2010b) states, that 
due to the physical and human geographic challenges to development, Laos is 
constrained in its opportunities for generating income to alleviate poverty and achieve 
social development goals. The physical geography of Laos with its abundance of rivers 
and mountains, provides the country with significant hydropower potential which 
proponents contend, has been highly undeveloped at this point. 
 Percentage wise, the amount of electricity exported by Laos has experienced 
extreme fluctuations in the past two decades. Figure 4 shows the amount of exported 
electricity as the percentage of total net generation. This was calculated by dividing the 
total amount of electricity exports by the total net generation. 
 In the period before 1997-1998, export percentages ranged from a low of about 
60% to highs over 70%. 1997-1998 saw a drastic increase in export percentages rising to 
around 80% of total net generation. From 2000 to 2003 a decrease was present 
percentage wise, with a slight increase in the following year. However, since 2004 the 
percentage has seen decreasing totals due to increasing domestic energy consumption, 
 increased domestic production, and periods of decline in Thai electricity imports. This is 




    
Figure 4. Laotian exported electricity as percentage of total net electricity generation 




Figure 5. Laotian electricity production, exports, and consumption 1990-2008 






Figure 6. Thai Electricity Imports 1990-2009 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011 
 
 Hydropower consists of a major percentage of Laotian electricity totals. 
Percentage wise, hydropower has accounted for at least 90% of total generation in the 
past 20 years as evidenced by Figure 7. This was calculated by dividing the net 
hydropower generation by the total net generation. 
 Beginning from the start of the study period, hydropower has constituted at least 
90% of total net generation. A decrease is present in 1997 lasting until roughly 1999 
where percentages stayed constant until small increases in 2003.  Clearly hydropower is 
the key source in Laotian electricity production. 
The number of projects operational, under construction and planned has also risen 






Figure 7. Total Laotian hydroelectric generation as a percentage of total net generation 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011 
 
Table 1. 
Status of Laotian hydropower projects 1970-2020 
Status  Number of 
projects 
Percentage 
Operational  14 16.5 
Under 
construction 
 9 10.6 
Planning stage  62 72.9 
Total  85 100 
Source: EdL 2011 
 
 As of 2011, 14 hydropower projects are currently operational, producing power 
and revenue for developers and the Lao government. 9 projects are currently under 
construction in the Laos with a further 62 in various stages of planning (Edl 2011). 
Operational projects span to the beginning of hydropower development in Laos 





Figure 8. Total number of operational, under construction, and planned hydropower 
projects by given commercial operational year, 1970-2020 
Source: EdL 2011 
 
As evidenced by Figure 8 which shows the commercial operational year for operational, 
planned, and projects under construction, only six projects came online from 1970 to 
1998. In contrast, between 1999 and 2011, 8 projects have either come online or are 
scheduled to begin operation. Compared to an average of 0.21 projects per year between 
1970 and 1998, the last 12 years have seen an average of 0.66 projects becoming 
operational. While of course there cannot be a half or a quarter of a hydropower project, 
these numbers are clearly reflective of a pattern of increased hydropower development in 
Laos. While Table 1 indicates 62 projects currently in the planning stage, only 32 of 
those currently have projected operational dates due to the nature of planning and 






 The spatial distribution of Laotian hydropower projects also shows patterns 
present. Figure 9 presents total number of projects operational, under constructed or 
planned, while Table 2 shows the number of projects and associated statuses by province. 
As Figure 9 and Table 2 show, the highest numbers of projects are located in the 
Vientiane Province as well as the Champasak Province. Figure 9 also shows the location 
of the Mekong River and other major bodies of inland water in Laos. Northern Laos has a 
higher amount of projects due to the terrain in the northern region, which is conductive to 
hydropower construction. 
 High numbers of projects in both Vientiane and Champasak are due to the 
location of the Mekong River and associated tributaries that are suitable for hydropower 
development. Unfortunately, specific locations of projects are not available at this time 
for geo-visualization.    
Capacity 
Another measurement of hydropower development is in the form of the installed 
capacity in terms of electricity generation for new projects in a given year. Measured in 
Megawatts (Mw), the total installed capacity can give some idea to the extent of the size 
of projects built or planned. For reference, 1 Mw = 1000 Kw. Figure 10 shows visually 
the sum of the total capacity for newly operational, planned, and projects under 






Figure 9. Distribution of operational, under construction, and planned hydropower 







Number of operational, under construction, and planned hydropower projects by province 








Attapeu  0 1 7 8 9.4 
Bokeo  1 0 1 2 2.4 
Bolikhamxay  1 1 5 7 8.2 
Champasak  2 0 8 10 11.8 
Houaphan  0 1 5 6 7.1 
Khammouane  1 0 1 2 2.4 
Luangnamtha  0 1 1 2 2.4 
Luangprabang  1 1 5 7 8.2 
Oudomxay  1 0 2 3 3.5 
Phonsaly  0 0 1 1 1.2 
Saravane  2 0 1 3 3.5 
Savannakhet  0 1 3 4 4.7 
Sekong  0 1 5 6 7.1 
Vientiane  5 0 7 12 14.1 
Vientiane 
Municipality 
 0 0 1 1 1.2 
Xayabouri  0 1 5 6 7.1 
Xiengkhouang  0 1 4 5 5.9 
Totals  14 11 62 85 100.0 





Figure 10. Sum of installed hydro electricity generation capacity for operational, planned, 
and under construction projects, 1970-2020 
Source: EdL 2011 
 
Clearly before 1998, the installed capacity of new projects was quite small with 
the only significant contributions to capacity coming in 1971 and 1990. Post-1998 
however, we begin to see a change in terms of installed capacity. Starting with the 
Theun-Hinbou Hydropower Project which came online in 1998, additional projects in 
terms of numbers and capacity begin to come online as well. 2010 saw the most 
significant increase in capacity in the last two decades with the addition of nearly 1500 
Mw of capacity added to the Laotian electrical system. While 2011 shows a decrease in 
new capacity until 2014, a slew of new projects are expected to be built and increase the 
hydroelectric capacity of Laos even further. In 2018 alone, planned projects are expected 
to contribute at least 2200 Mw of new capacity. Individual project capacity over this time 
span has ranged from small scale projects of only 1 Mw, to large scale projects of greater 




has shown constant increases since 1993. Figure 11 shows the trend present in 
hydropower capacity. 
 
Figure 11. Total installed hydropower capacity 1990-2009 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011 
 Major increases came at different years, notably 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2003. 
Since 2003 capacity has stayed at a constant level around 0.72 million Mw. This number 
should increase with the projects currently under construction as well as the amount of 
planned projects in the next 10 years. Overall, capacity in both new projects and total has 
increased since 1990. Electricity production as well has seen increases with several 
periods of decline, but currently displaying an upward trend. The absolute number of new 
hydropower projects has also experienced an increase since the beginning of the 1990's 
and shows little sign of declining. This is in contrast to the declining amount of exported 






 Revenue from the sale of hydroelectricity is the most common reason used for the 
development of large scale hydropower projects. Laos is no exception in that it states that 
the revenue will be used for various purposes related to poverty reduction and 
improvements in socio-economic status (ADB 2004b, EdL 2010b, World Bank 2010b). 
Hence under the PESL framework, revenue is a major factor within the economic realm 
in terms of influences of development. While official statistics for hydropower revenue 
are not readily available, it is possible to estimate the profitability of hydropower in the 
last two decades for Laos. Utilizing the total amount of electricity exported in billion of 
Kw hours, this amount is multiplied by US$0.0345/Kwh for each year to determine a 
rough estimate of electricity export revenue. The amount per kilowatt hour is from the 
2008 Electricité du Laos power development plan, which assumed an average yield of 
0.0345 cents per kilowatt hour (EdL 2008). It is assumed that the average yield fluctuated 
from 1990 and was not a constant amount. The amount used in the 2008 plan serves as a 
general indicator of average revenue across the time period due to a lack of 
comprehensive information on revenue income and rates. Again this should be 
considered a rough estimate that provides a general picture of the amount of revenue 





Figure 12. Estimated Laotian electricity export revenue 
Source(s): EdL 2008, U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011 
 
 Estimated revenue until 1998 stayed fairly constant around 20 million U.S. 
dollars. In 1998, the Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project became operational, which is 
reflected in the major increase in revenue for the next three years reaching a peak of 101 
million dollars. From 2001 until 2002, export revenue experienced a decline rebounding 
in 2004 with the beginning of operations at the Nam Theun 2 project. When compared to 
Figures 3 and 4, the pattern mirrors the decreases in electricity exported and produced. 
When estimated revenue is calculated as a percentage of the GDP, a concerning pattern 
becomes present. Figure 13 displays GDP from 1990 to 2009, while Figure 14 shows the 





Figure 13. Laos GDP 1990-2009 (Current U.S. $ millions) 
Source: World Bank 2011b 
 
 
Figure 14. Estimated Laotian electricity export revenue as percentage of GDP 




While the GDP has shown constant growth since 1998, revenue presents a different story. 
Electricity export revenue at its highest represented 5.8% of Laos’ GDP in 2000 
following steep gains in the previous 3 years. Since 2000 however, this percentage has 
fallen, and in 2009 represented only 1.4%, the second lowest total since 1995. While the 
Laotian GDP growth rate must be taken into consideration as displayed in Figure 15, 
attention is drawn to the decreasing impact electricity export revenue is having upon the 
national economy.  
 
Figure 15. Laotian GDP growth rates (%) 1990-2009 
Source: World Bank 2011b 
 
Economic Benefits 
The Laotian macro and micro-economic situation has never been one of 
prosperity. Laos is poor and underdeveloped with a small domestic economy, limited 
trade opportunities, poor infrastructure, and low education and health levels. Additionally 




of building a prosperous nation (ADB 2009, EdL 2010b, World Bank 1998, 2011a). 
Hydropower revenue is seen as a strong, sustainable source of foreign revenue that can 
increase government returns and help to raise social standards such as the standard of 
living (ADB 2002, 2004b, 2009, EdL 2010b). Utilizing the PESL framework, these 
economic benefits are identified as a critical factor for the continuation of hydropower 
development.   
Revenue from hydropower projects is framed as highly beneficial on the national 
scale and seen as the major reason for increased hydropower development in the nation. 
The Asian Development Bank’s Study of Large Dams (2002) stresses that the reasoning 
behind the construction of large scale hydropower projects is usually made in terms of the 
realization of macroeconomic strategies or sectoral development objectives such as 
industrialization and poverty reduction (ADB 2002, 2-2).  
 The Asian Development Bank has found in general macroeconomic benefits are 
positive, but dam building cannot be taken for granted as the best answer for a country’s 
macroeconomic needs. These benefits are seen as supporting the nation as a whole 
primarily in terms of the economic rate of return, contribution to economic growth, GDP 
growth, and the strengthening of the nation’s external balance (ADB 2002, 2009, World 
Bank 2010a, 2011a). Hydroelectricity is stated to have contributed at least 3 percentage 
points to the economic growth of Laos, while contributions from hydropower projects are 
not only reflected in the revenue from the operation of the project, but through foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by international investors, which helps increase net capital 
inflows on a national scale (ADB 2009, World Bank 2009, 2010a, 2011a). Inflows of FDI 




investments such as hydropower projects (Virtanen 2006, 183). FDI inflow totals for 
Laos in the past two decades have varied as shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Laotian FDI inflows 1990-2009 
Source: World Bank 2011b  
 
 FDI inflows pre-1998 peaked at 160 million dollars in 1996, partially from 
investment in the Theun-Hinboun project. The Asian Financial Crisis is reflected in the 
loss of FDI following 1996, reaching a low of 4 million dollars in 2002. 2006 marked a 
significant increase in inflows due to investment in the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project. 
Inflow for 2007 reached a high of 324 million dollars although decreasing in the next 
year reflecting the most recent global recession. Figure 17 shows these amounts as a 
percentage of the GDP. There is evidence that FDI inflows have been affected by the two 
major financial crises in the last 20 years. In 1997 and 2008, inflow decreased 





Figure 17. Laotian FDI inflow as percentage of GDP 1990-2009 
Source: World Bank 2011b 
  
 Continuing increases in GDP serve as further reason for continued hydropower 
development which is in concurrence with official Lao government positions regarding 
the macroeconomic benefits of hydroelectricity. Figure 13 above showed the pattern of 
GDP increases since 1998. The Lao government views hydropower as the primary 
avenue of escape from its status as a third world nation. This is evident within the 
government’s official economic development plans where references to hydropower as 
playing a pivotal role in achieving the social and economic development goals of the Lao 
PDR are a common theme (EdL 2010b, ADB 2009). Laos’ power system development 
plan states in its overview of the Laotian power sector, that the earning of foreign 
exchange is one of two vital national priorities and is at the heart of the Laos’ strategy for 




 Additionally, hydropower is integrated as part of Laos’ National Poverty and 
Eradication Programme by the Lao government, which plans for the elimination of 
poverty via sustained, equitable economic growth, and social development (Virtanen 
2006, 185). In order for this to be achieved, the economy has required investment in 
industrialization and modernization and a growth rate of no less than 7% per year of 
which hydropower development is considered a major part of. When the growth rate of 
the GDP is compared against the electricity export revenue and the amount of FDI 
inflow, and electricity export revenue, interesting trends become present. This is 
evidenced in Figure 18 which compares the three amounts over the past 20 years. 
 
Figure 18. Comparison of FDI inflow, electricity export revenue, and GDP growth 1990-
2009 
Source: EdL 2008, U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011, World Bank 2011b 
 
From Figure 18, there appears to be no strong relationships present between these three 




2008 FDI inflows represented just over 4% of the GDP compared to only 1.7% for 
electricity revenue. From roughly 2004, GDP growth and FDI level saw an increase 
suggesting that FDI had a slight positive effect upon economic growth versus electricity 
export revenues in this period. What remains unknown is how much of the FDI inflow is 
used in the investment of hydropower projects. This highlights concerns that critics have 
over the actual contribution large-scale, export oriented hydropower projects make 
towards national economic goals as well as strengthens concerns about potential 
macroeconomic benefits (EDF 2005b, IRN 2004, 2008b).  
Factors Contributing to Hydropower Development 
Economics – Investors and Financing 
One of the primary economic factors under the PESL framework that is a 
contributing factor is the role sponsors and investors have had in the Laotian hydropower 
sector. Multiple parties including the Electricité du Laos, World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, foreign development agencies, and private investors from a variety 
of countries make up the map of investors in Laotian hydropower. This in turn can 
influence the patterns of development by parties who may exhibit rent-seeking behavior. 
The listing of projects by Electricité du Laos (2011) and International Rivers Network 
(2010) lists shareholders and sponsors in individual projects, as well as tells whether a 
project is built for domestic usage, or is an independent power producer project built 
primarily for export. Of the 85 projects listed, at least 48 are sponsored in part by the 
Electricité du Laos, Laotian government, or domestic companies. Some uncertainly is 
present due to the ambiguity in where specific sponsors are located or operate from. 




are sponsored or funded by Chinese sources. Additional sources include sponsors from 
Korea, Malaysia, Japan, Europe, and the U.S. (EdL 2011, IRN 2010). While the high 
number of domestic sources suggests that decisions to build projects are driven primarily 
by domestic investors, it is important to note that domestic shares in projects can range 
from full ownership to as little as 10 percent (EdL 2011, IRN 2010). This may indicate 
that decision making process concerning the building of projects may not always be 
primarily in Laotian hands. While sponsors are an important influence to patterns, they 
also require a source of funding. Sponsors have had two options in securing funding, 
public and private financing. More sponsors are moving to non-traditional private sources 
of funding, compared to past projects which relied upon public funding from 
development and international lending agencies (Maunsell 2004, 22).  
Private financing has a key role in affecting hydropower development patterns. 
More and more projects are shifting away from public to private financing (Maunsell 
2004). Under the build, own, operate, and transfer (BOOT) financing model, the 
government enters into a concession agreement with a private investor or developer, who 
under the terms of the agreement, construct, operate, and own the project, while the 
government, at times through Electricité du Laos, holds 20-25% of the equity in the 
project (Smits and Bush 2010, 118). Often, private owners will also pay royalties to the 
government in exchange for being allowed to operate the dam. After a term of years as 
defined by the concession agreement, the ownership of the project is transferred to the 
government at no additional cost. Usage of the BOOT model is heavily promoted by both 
the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank (ADB 2009, Virtanen 2006). BOOT 




government financial, technical, and human resources, as well as building government 
capacity. They are also seen as being commercially viable and being effectively 
implemented, as well as allowing for environmental standards to be built into the project 
from the beginning (Viratanen 2006, 184). In essence, BOOT agreements allow for the 
mass development of hydropower in a developing country by circumventing financial 
and capital deficiencies the host country may have. They also reduce the burden 
international donor and development agencies may have in supporting these types of 
projects.    
 BOOT agreements are not always seen in such a positive light. While BOOT 
projects offer a promise of cheap electricity for domestic usage and the opportunity for 
export revenue earnings, they also provide a venue for rent-seeking behavior by the 
parties involved. This in turn can push a drive for further large scale expansion that has 
little reflection on potential environmental and social costs (Smits and Bush 2010, 125). 
According to Smits and Bush (2010), at least 70 Laotian hydropower projects are being 
implemented under a BOOT model. If indeed rent-seeking behavior is driving BOOT 
projects, there is cause for alarm in relation to the negative consequences of hydropower 
development. 
 The private financing model itself has weaknesses that are inherent. This was 
recognized in the power system development plan for Laos developed by the Manusell 
consultation group in collaboration with the Laotian Department of Energy and Ministry 
of Industry and Handicrafts (Maunsell 2004).  The selection of projects to be funded and 
constructed is ad-hoc and suboptimal. There is often little discrimination of bad projects 




behavior. Power purchasing agreements set up for each individual project give 
advantages to the purchasers of electricity who are not dependent upon buying electricity 
from a single project. Additionally low transparency in terms of true costs to the Lao 
government is a common feature of private financing. Combined with infant standards 
concerning the procurement of private financing as well as being un-enforced at times, 
the private financing model presents an environment of massive uncertainty concerning 
the actual benefits of private financing (Maunsell 2004, 24).  
Another interesting fact is despite the Asian Development Bank being one of the 
leading public funding sources for Laotian hydropower development, next to the World 
Bank and private investment, the Asian Development Bank itself has recognized that 
large dam building may not be the best answer to Laos’ economic problems. As 
mentioned before, the Asian Development Bank has admitted that dams cannot be taken 
for granted as the best answer to the macroeconomic needs for import substitution or 
exports (ADB 2002, 3-8, IRN 2008a). Yet, hydropower remains a primary focus for these 
institutions in the form of continued funding and promotion for large scale projects and is 
still seen as a key element in the development schemes of Laos. It appears that the 
absolute benefits in terms of national economic growth and strengthening the nation's 
fragile economic portfolio, as well as the physical geographic situation, outweigh any 
major relative risks and costs of continued funding of these projects. 
Policy, Planning and Regulation 
Government policy is recognized under the PESL framework as a significant legal 
factor. In general, government policy has had a positive effect upon hydropower 




have seen new levels of transparency, disclosure, and participation since the initial 
processes that were formulated during the construction of Nam Ngum 1 in 1971. New 
laws and policies related to the development of hydropower have been created such as the 
National Policy on Resettlement and Compensation (Lao PDR 2003a). The result has 
been the development of new standards and procedures such as the release of various 
development plans, technical reports, requirements for public consultation and 
participation, and the creation of international panels of experts to provide an 
international review of projects (POE 1997). While this is remarkable in a country not 
known for disclosure, transparency, and participation, it must be remembered that the 
creation of these new policies and laws, as well as the higher level of disclosure and 
participation are now required in order to gain the large amount of funding needed for 
large scale hydropower projects from international donors and lending institutions (Singh 
2009, Winn and Baardsen, 2010).  
In the present more extensive planning and information is now required by policy 
and law to go forward with such large scale development plans. As a result of the amount 
of capital and investment necessary for the construction of major infrastructure projects, 
the 1990’s saw the creation of the Water and Water Resources Law (Lao PDR 1996), and 
the Law on Electricity (Lao PDR 1997). These two laws helped to establish firm policies 
and create frameworks for establishing procedures and creating management strategies 
related to the environment and revenue management. This helped to show that Laos was 
taking steps towards creating an investor friendly environment in terms of protection and 
public image. This was also during the time when memorandums were signed with 




hydropower projects. While the 1997 Asian financial crisis saw a limited number of 
projects actually built, the ground work was laid for future large scale hydropower 
projects  
Further policies and laws have been created in the last decade, creating further 
legal frameworks that have helped to accommodate increased private investment in 
infrastructure projects such as hydropower dams (Lao PDR 2006a, 2). Table 3 lists 
several significant policies and laws created in the past 20 years and detail their 
significance. 
Table 3. 
Significant policies and laws related to hydropower development 
Name  Year Significance 
Water and Water 
Resources Law 
 1996 Established rights and 
ownership of water 
resources in Laos 
Law on 
Electricity 
 1997 Established procedure and 
policy as related to the 






 2003 Detailed eligibility, 
responsibilities, and 
obligations as related to 
resettlement and 
compensation concerning 
infrastructure construction  




 2004 Defined rights and 
responsibilities of foreign 





 2006 Established framework and 
procedure for independent 







 2006 Built upon policies and 
procedures developed in the 
Nam Theun 2 project and 
codified them for all 
hydropower projects post 
1990 




Of interest especially related to the spatial aspect of hydropower development is 
the Law on the Promotion of Foreign Investment. Articles 17 and 18 of the law detail 
special benefits and concessions concerning the investment in certain regions of Laos. 
Three zones of investment are laid out relating to the geography of the zone and 
suitability of foreign investment. Table 4 details these zones and associated benefits. 
Table 4.  
Foreign investment zones and benefits 
 Description Benefits 
Zone 1 Mountain, plain, and plateau 
zones with no economic 
infrastructure to facilitate 
investment  
Profit tax exemption for 7 
years, profit tax rate of 10% 
Zone 2 Mountain, plain, and  
plateau zones with moderate 
level of economic 
infrastructure suitable to 
accommodate investment to 
some extent 
Profit tax exemption for 5 
years, thereafter reduced 
profit tax rate of 7.5% for 3 
years, thereafter 15% rate 
Zone 3 Mountain, plain, and plateau 
zones with good 
infrastructure to support 
investment 
Profit tax exemption for 2 
years, 10% reduced profit 
rate for 2 years, there after 
20% rate 
Source: Lao PDR 2004 
 
As shown by Table 4, zones 1 and 2 offer the greatest incentives for foreign investment 
in terms of tax rates, exemptions, and time frames. This has a direct impact on investment 
in hydropower. Hydropower development takes places generally in zones 1 and 2, where 
physical geographic conditions are favorable for hydropower potential. These areas are 
generally rural, isolated places with little infrastructure present. Investors find a high 
level of benefits when involved in hydropower projects that are constructed in these 
zones. While the law does not offer a strict spatial definition of the investment zones, a 




patterns present. Keeping in mind the low levels of economic, infrastructure, and social 
development in Laos, it seems that the provinces with the highest number of projects are 
the most beneficial in terms of foreign investment. Given the importance of investment 
and profitability in hydropower development, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
development in these provinces was in part influenced by the benefits of investment in 
specific regions. 
The effect of the creation of new policy and law is reflected in part in the numbers 
related to hydropower development. Without the right investment environment created by 
law and policy, the number of projects planned and under construction, as well as total 
hydroelectricity produced, would be significantly less. This would be the result of the 
reluctance of investors to become involved without protection and a firm position on 
benefits received. Investors would not likely risk involvement in high-risk projects 
without subsidies and guarantees from the government or international funding 
institutions (Virtanen 2006, 184). In the Nam Theun 2 project, in addition to a 50 million 
dollar loan to the Nam Theun Power Company and a 20 million dollar loan to the Lao 
government, the Asian Development Bank provided a 50 million dollar guarantee to 
investors in the event of project failure (ADB 2010b, Winn and Baardsen 2010). The 
World Bank as well has provided financial guarantees and security in hydropower 
projects to investors. Through risk guarantees of at least 132 million dollars, the World 
Bank has provided security for loans made in support of Nam Theun 2 (World Bank 
2009, 4). It must be noted that the creation of these policies and laws was meant to 




Laos was taking steps toward building modern policies that would encourage quicker and 
larger investment towards such projects (Singh 2009).  
Geopolitical Factors 
Laotian hydropower development has been affected by the influence of regional 
geopolitics. As mentioned previously, PESL recognizes that geopolitics are a major 
political factor. The region in general has a long and turbulent geopolitical history that 
has helped to shape hydropower development by both inhibiting and promoting it in 
different time periods. A long history of conflict had helped to stall major large scale 
development in the region and especially in Laos, which as stated previously, 
experienced high levels of conflict and political instability from the World War II era up 
to the 1980's.  
Plans for hydropower development have been affected by broader events and 
ideologies for the past 50 years (Hirsch 2010). The Mekong Committee formed in 1957, 
the predecessor to the Mekong River Commission, was instrumental in the period pre-
Second Indochina War for the promotion of development by establishing links between 
the states and fostering communication and the exchange of ideas (Hirsch 2010, Bakker 
1999). The committee was formed under the auspices of the United Nations, but under 
the de facto hegemony of the U.S. as part of its efforts to de-rail the spread of 
communism in the region. The committee’s plans included building a series of dams on 
the mainstream Mekong River, creating a series of stepped lakes from northern Laos to 
the head of the delta. These plans were part of a development based geopolitical effort to 
pre-empt communism through building prosperity and enhancing the influence of the 




development models and strategies for Laos. Dam building was seen in the west as a key 
element of a national solution for transforming an entire peripheral region, which found 
its origins in the Tennessee Valley Authority projects of the 1950’s (Baghel and Nüsser 
2010, 236). 
Despite these plans and western support, the only large scale hydropower project 
to emerge out of the efforts of the Mekong Committee was the Nam Ngum 1 dam in Laos 
(ADB 2002). Further development was halted and the committee disbanded with the 
Second Indochina War and the communist victory in Vietnam in 1975. Even though 
hydropower development had elements of western influence, it still found support from 
communist governments in Southeast Asia. This is apparent in the case of Nam Ngum 1. 
Despite fighting and civil strife in Laos during the construction period, the Pathet Lao, 
the predecessors to the future Lao PDR, were fully committed to the project. The project 
was seen by communists in Laos as a valuable resource for the whole country (ADB 
2002, 2-17). Hydropower development in the 1980’s was hampered by a lack of 
resources, planning, and most importantly funding. This was in part due to the prevailing 
political alignments which prevented cooperation as well as political isolation of Laos 
from 1975 to 1987 (ADB 2002). 
 With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990’s, opportunity for rapprochement 
between non-communist Thailand and its communist neighbors became possible. This 
also coincided with an increased demand for energy by Thailand due to its economic 
growth and industrialization in the latter part of the 20
th
 century (Hirsch 2010, 314). Thai 
economic growth spurred interest in purchasing Laotian hydropower. Thailand had 




domestic and international environmental groups, most hydropower development has 
been halted (Maunsell 2004, 62). Vietnam also had interest in Laotian hydropower during 
this time period. Memorandums of understanding with Laos for the purchase of 
electricity were signed with Laos in the mid 1990’s (IRN 2008b, 13). However the Asian 
Financial Crisis killed much interest in demand for Laotian hydropower until the 
beginning part of the 2000’s. Bi-lateral investment however in the new century has seen 
an increase between Laos and its neighbors, which has spurred the construction of new 
dams. From the perspective of the regional governments, bi-lateral investment reduces 
the need to go through the hoops of safeguard policies of international funding 
institutions and offers a more independent process in terms of supporting new projects 
(Hirsch 2010, 319). Official statistics however are not cited.  
The 21
st
 century has seen the emergence of a new geopolitics in the regions which 
has had implications for the development of hydropower in not only Laos, but the region 
as a whole (Hirsch 2010, McDonald et al. 2009). Perhaps the most significant 
development in the last two decades has been the rise of China both politically and 
economically. With a growing economy driven by industrial development and an ever 
increasing population, as well as increased demand for power, China has seen a growing 
political influence and development role via investment, aid, and trade (Hirsch 2010, 
319). Chinese electricity consumption in the past two decades has also increased as 
evidenced by Figure 19.  
China due to its own experiences in the hydro-industry has begun to provide 
funding and technical expertise to other states that are in the process of developing 





Figure 19. Chinese electricity consumption – Billion Kw hours, 1990-2009 
Source: World Bank 2011b 
 
development in the region serves as the primary source of information for geopolitical 
contributions due to their extensive search of Chinese government documents, company 
web sites and ground-based fieldwork. Chinese influence in the Laotian hydropower 
sector is reflected by investment in Laotian tributary and mainstream Mekong River 
projects. As of 2009, at least 13 projects were noted by McDonald et al. as being funded 
or sponsored by Chinese parties (McDonald et al. 2009, S298). Although Chinese 
companies are at the forefront of investment in Laotian hydropower, they are also part of 
a rapidly growing influence and deeper role for China in the region via investment, aid, 
and trade relationships (Hirsch 2010, 319).  
While at times this aid is “no-strings” attached, McDonald et als. have suggested 
that China has much to gain by exporting its money and expertise in hydropower This has 




as a growing economy and nation has required natural resources and energy to support 
this growth. Chinese electricity consumption has risen as evidenced by Figure 17 above.  
Hydropower has represented one avenue to acquire resources via concession agreements 
for resource extraction in exchange for aid for hydro-development as well as power 
purchasing agreements with its neighbors for electricity (McDonald et al. 2009). While 
signs are certainly present that suggests China’s increasing role in the Laotian 
hydropower sector, a lack of solid evidence such as investment levels for hydropower 
projects in Laos weakens the potential effect that China as a geopolitical factor may have.  
Regionally, the goal of the Southeast Asian nations has been one of creating a 
"sub-region that is prosperous, integrated, and harmonious" (ADB 2011b). Laotian 
national goals have fallen in line with the regional goal of developing a prosperous and 
integrated region. Beginning in the 1990’s, Laos has set a goal of becoming a “battery” 
for the region in terms of hydropower (IRN 2008b, Loo and De Clerq 2007). This goal 
has been made easier in part due to the lack of or slowing of hydropower development by 
Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam (ADB 2004b). In order to achieve this, Laos has had 
to gain access to resources and revenue that under its past political and economic system, 
it was unable to access due to political isolation during the Cold War. This in turn has 
required a shift to a market economy as well as greater integration via the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (GMS) to create a favorable investment environment. Isolated during 
much of the Cold War period, Laos has also attempted to move from a landlocked to a 
landlinked nation through the development of transportation networks, agricultural ties, 





Consequences of Hydropower Development 
 Hydropower has numerous benefits ranging from being clean and renewable 
source of energy for domestic usage, generating revenue for poverty reduction and 
environmental protection, and contributing to national economic growth (ADB 2002, 
World Bank 2010b). Yet it also entails consequences that are present in various realms 
and across multiple geographic scales. The PESL framework, besides helping to identify 
specific factors that influence the hydropower sector, also helps to identify areas of key 
consequences in political, social, and economic realms. Negative consequences of 
hydropower development in Laos are said to be present in terms of socio-economics, 
mitigation, resettlement, and compensation practices, and in the geopolitical situation of 
Laos. Most often, Laotian hydropower projects have been condemned for damaging the 
environment and negatively impacting the livelihoods of vulnerable rural communities 
(ADB 2010a, 8). Yet the scale and magnitude of these consequences is often debated 
between proponents and critics of hydropower development. 
Socio-Economic Consequences 
Much of the debate and controversy concerning the Laotian hydropower sector 
concerns the socio-economic effects and consequences of development. Improvement to 
the socio-economic status of the Laotian people is a key rationale used in the building of 
hydropower projects for export revenue. Yet there exists a sharp divide on whether 
hydropower has helped accomplish any kind of socio-economic improvement. Current 
positions on the socio-economic effects and consequences of hydropower range between 
two extremes. The first is a very pro-hydropower position that emphasizes hydropower’s 




that lack life’s basic elements such as electricity, running water, and education, to 
providing modernized settlements and a modern infrastructure that leaves not only 
project affected people, but the nation as a whole better off than they were before (ADB 
2009, 2010a, 2010b, NTPC 2008, Winn and Baardsen 2010).  
The second position represents a strong anti-hydropower stance that focuses on 
the relative costs of large scale hydropower projects on the local, village level in Laos, 
which believes that the negative track record of dam projects in Laos in environmental, 
social, and economic terms does not justify the construction of further projects. 
Additionally this position emphasizes the large number of people that will be affected by 
not only the construction, but by the operation of, and institutional processes related to 
the revenue generated by these projects (EDF 2005a, 2005b, FIVAS 2007, Imhof 2006, 
IRN 2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2009).  
If hydropower is actually helping to improve socio-economic statuses, a positive 
relationship should exist between the two. Essentially, if socio-economic indicators 
continue to improve, in conjunction with increases in hydropower development, this can 
be seen by hydropower proponents such as the Lao government and the Electricité du 
Laos as stronger reasoning for increased development. While the quantification of 
benefits is admittedly difficult for some variables, a fact admitted by both sides of the 
debate, other indicators of socio-economic consequences can be examined from a 
quantitative perspective via descriptive statistical analysis (ADB 2002, 4-21, FIVAS 
2007). While direct statistics relating hydropower’s contributions to socio-economic 




relationship between hydropower development and socio-economic variables can be 
approximated. 
 A key area where proponents and critics disagree is the effects of hydropower on 
agriculture and food. Agricultural land loss as a result of inundation, flooding or erosion 
is a common concern that is voiced by critics at the local village scale (IRN 2004, 2007, 
2009). Without agricultural land, food security becomes a major risk especially at the 
village level, resulting in requests for rice and food assistance. This is especially poignant 
considering that, “access to rice is still the most important factor in determining the 
welfare status of the Lao people in rural areas” (ADB 2009, 43). Given these effects, an 
inverse relationship in regards to land loss and rice production, against hydropower 
production should be expected. This however does not seem to be the case.  
Losses of land have varied. For example the Theun-Hinboun project resulted in 
the loss of an estimated 68 ha of river terrace to erosion, while villages reported losses 
range from 30 ha to 70 ha of agricultural land to flooding (FIVAS 2007). In other areas 
1000 to 2000 ha of paddy land was reported to be abandoned due to flooding as a result 
of the THPC expansion project (IRN 2008b, 39). For reference, 1 ha = 2.47 acres. 
Additionally, critics note the decreases at the local level of rice paddy production both at 
resettlement sites as well as village sites down river of dam projects (IRN 2004, 2008a, 
2009, FIVAS 2007). Yet national level statistics for rice paddy production in general 
show increases in both tonnes harvested as well as area harvested as illustrated by Figures 





Figure 20. Laotian rice paddy production 1990-2007 (tonnes) 
Source: United Nations 2011 
 
 
Figure 21. Laotian rice paddy area harvested 1990-2007 





While critics cite major losses of agricultural land at the local, village level, the 
national level statistics again paint a different story. Figure 22 shows the amount of 
agricultural land available in the country. It appears that in contrast to the critic’s reports 
of mass losses of agricultrual land, there has been increases, at least on a national level. 
This discrepency is interersting as it highlights potential problems in terms of reporting 
agricultural losses, as well as who and what defines agricultural land. Some of this gain 
may be due to the usage of electricity from hydropower projects in supporting more 
advanced agricultural technology, thereby increasing yields. Increases in agricultural  
land area avaliable may be attributed to land gained that previously had not been 
avaliable due to seasonal flooding, now controlled by the dam projects. Land may also be 
gained through the clearing of forests for project related construction. 
 
Figure 22. Agricultural Land available in Laos 




Another explanation for the difference between critics and supporters is in what 
constitutes agricultural land loss. Critics have cited losses relating to various aspects of 
agriculture such as loss of grazing land for livestock, as an example, at least 45,000 ha 
were reported to be lost during the creation of the Nam Theun 2 reservoir (EDF 2005a, 
4). National level statistics however define agricultural land as the share of land area that 
is arable, under permanent crops, and under permanent pasture (World Bank 2011b). 
Temporary agricultural land such as seasonal pastoral land and river bank land that may 
be affected by seasonal flooding are to the best knowledge not included in this statistic. 
As stated previously, hydropower development is part of Laos’ national poverty 
eradication strategy, providing funds for improving the quality of life in general for the 
people of the nation. Improvements in public health are one of the key aspects of poverty 
eradication, and are reflected by statements of their importance by multiple parties 
involved (ADB 2010a, 2010b, Barney 2007, World Bank, 1998, 2010b, Winn and 
Baardsen 2010). These improvements are reflected in such proxies as life expectancy, 
decreases in infant mortality rate, and health care expenditures per capita. The question 
remains how much of this is due to the influence of hydropower. Figure 23 shows 
increases in life expectancy in the past two decades, while Table 5 shows decreases in 
infant mortality rate. Figure 24 shows increases in health care expenditures per capita. 
 Money for improvements in these variables is stated to have come from official 
development assistance as well as hydropower revenue (ADB 2009, 39). At local levels, 





Figure 23. Laotian life expectancy 1990-2009 




Infant mortality rate - Laos 
 Year 
 1990 2000 2009 
Deaths per 1000 
people 
108 64 46 






Figure 24. Laotian health expenditures per capita (Current U.S. $) 
Source: World Health Organization 2011 
 
medical supplies, medicine cabinets and sanitation facilities in local villages. At the 
national level improving access to public health programs, education programs, and 
improving the equity, efficiency and sustainability of health financing are the primary 
goals of improving the health status of the population of Laos (ADB 2009, Barney 2007, 
FIVAS 2007, NTPC 2008, Winn and Baardsen 2010, World Bank 2009, 2010b). Yet due 
to a lack of solid evidence of hydropower revenue being used in this manner, uncertainty 
is cast whether the increases seen in hydropower development can actually be effective in 
the accomplishment of socio-economic development goals. 
Resettlement, Mitigation, and Compensation Consequences  
Large scale hydropower projects by their nature entail massive physical changes 
to the environment ranging from decreases in biodiversity, inundation of land, and 




changes often result in the need for resettlement and the mitigation of the effects of dam 
building, both physical and economical. Given the increase in the number of dam projects 
as well as the increase in their size and capacity, it is prudent to examine how 
development patterns have affected the aspects of resettlement, mitigation, and 
compensation. Both critics and proponents of hydropower development have noted that 
the larger the magnitude of people displaced, the scale of social impacts increases, the 
more compensation is needed, resulting in less likelihood of livelihood restoration (ADB 
2002, 2004b, EDF 2004, 2005a, 2005b, IRN 2008b, 2009). 
In general, policy and procedures related to resettlement and mitigation have 
evolved since the beginning of large scale hydropower development in the 1970’s.  This 
is most evident in the creation of established policies related to resettlement, as well as 
the establishment of requirements and guidelines concerning the mitigation of negative 
effects of hydropower development. The National Policy on Resettlement and 
Compensation (Lao PDR 2003a), the Decree on Resettlement and Compensation (Lao 
PDR 2003b) and the National Policy on the Environmental and Social Sustainability of 
Hydropower (Lao PDR 2006b) were created to establish such standards and guidelines. 
Both the national policy and the decree define resettlement as referring to all measures 
taken by project proponents to mitigate any and all adverse social impacts of a project on 
affected persons. This includes compensation for lost assets and incomes and the 
provision of other entitlements, income restoration assistance and relocation, as needed 
(Lao PDR 2003a, 3). Compensation is defined as payments in cash or in-kind for an asset 
to be acquired or affected by a project at replacement cost. Entitlements are a range of 




income substitution, and relocation which are due to affected people, depending on the 
type and degree of loss (Lao PDR 2003a, 1). Relocation is simply defined as the physical 
shifting of an affected person from their pre-project place of residence (Lao PDR 2003a, 
3). 
Through compensation and mitigation projects, developers and the Lao 
government have attempted to mitigate the negative effects of large scale hydropower 
development. Compensation of the loss of agricultural land and improving food security 
at a local level in recent projects such as Nam Theun 2 has been done through the 
provision of new land, rehabilitation of small-scale irrigation systems, assistance in 
transitioning from slash-and-burn agriculture, instruction in the use of fertilizers, as well 
as limited food assistance (ADB 2010b, World Bank 2009, 2010b).  
Organizations such as the Asian Development Bank and World Bank cite success 
in resettlement and mitigation measures in relation to several projects such as Theun-
Hinboun and Nam Theun 2. Several summary reports by the Asian Development Bank 
and World Bank detail individual successes linked to the resettlement and mitigation 
processes developed and enacted in the construction of the Nam Theun 2 project. The 
World Bank believes that the resettlement process in the Nam Theun 2 project was a 
success, due to the new initiatives that were pioneered in the process that enabled social 
change and livelihood transformations (World Bank 2010b). Both the organizations see 
resettlement and mitigation related to increased hydropower development as side 
opportunities to enact livelihood transformations, rather than simple livelihood 




development, this will spur changes that will allow livelihood transformations which are 
painted as improvements over the past situation (ADB 2010a, World Bank 2010b).  
Livelihood restoration comprises a key part of resettlement that is recognized by 
both sides of hydropower development as well as being particularly challenging in any 
context (ADB 2009, EDF 2004, 2005b, IRN 2004, 2008b, World Bank 2010b). While 
both sides understand that money alone will not reduce poverty, restoration following the 
construction of hydropower projects is seen very differently whether one supports or 
opposes large scale hydropower development (ADB 2009, IRN 2008b, World Bank 
2009, 2010b).  
In the Nam Theun 2 relocation and mitigation efforts, the focus upon livelihood 
transformation rather than livelihood restoration is apparent in the emphasis upon several 
pillars of development including: agriculture and rice stock, community forestry, 
reservoir and fisheries, and off-farm income. It is expected that each of these pillars will 
make a substantial contribution to the livelihoods of resettled communities (World Bank 
2010b, 17). The agricultural pillar for example involves improving yields from 
agricultural land, as well as introducing the concept of participatory land use planning, 
which is meant to help create a shared understanding of land use rights and 
responsibilities (World Bank 2010b, 19). This involves education of local peoples of 
methods, concepts, and technologies that before the project had been foreign to them. The 
other pillars also represent livelihood transformation by introducing concepts such as 
open markets, property and fishery rights, and skill building in non-agricultural 
livelihoods. This transformation has raised concerns at the village level about access to 




sufficient land for the next generation of villagers (IRN 2008b, World Bank 2010b, 34). 
Villagers still feel ties to the land but according to proponent reports, they report 
satisfaction with infrastructure improvements and their quality of life suggesting that 
villagers make cost/benefit analyses given the context of their situation (Winn and 
Baardsen 2010, World Bank 2010b). 
Critics however, have voiced their displeasure with several components of  
compensation in various dam projects including: lack of compensation for aspects of food 
security such as the loss of fishing nets and boats; the lack of “land for land” 
compensation as required by the National Policy on Resettlement and Compensation 
(Lao PDR 2003a, 4); small (1-2ha) plots of land that were considered poor quality for 
rice growth and other agricultural growth; an improper focus upon infrastructure support 
rather than livelihood restoration; and a lack of direct compensation for agricultural and 
food losses (FIVAS 2007, IRN 2004, 2008a, 2008b). 
Additional criticism is focused on the scope of eligibility for mitigation and 
compensation. In an assessment of compliance with Laotian law in the Theun-Hinboun 
Expansion Project, critics of hydropower development focus on what they see as a 
loophole for developers by taking advantage of a semantic difference between 
“resettlement” and “relocation” (IRN 2008b, 2009). IRN states that the Theun-Hinboun 
Power Company , the operator and developer of the project, calls the resettlement that 
was required “relocation”, somehow implying that resettlement standards set by the 
National Policy on Resettlement and Compensation do not apply, which would allow the 




The assessment of the Theun-Hinboun expansion touches upon a key issue in the 
development of hydropower development resettlement plans and mitigation strategies, 
that of the definition of affected persons. The National Policy on Resettlement and 
Compensation states that all persons residing, cultivating, or making a living within an 
area to be acquired for a project as of the formally recognized cut-off date should be 
considered project affected persons, thus entitled to measures of compensation and 
mitigation (Lao PDR 2003a, 3). Where disagreement lies is in the spatial definition of an 
“affected person”. While official government policy states that affected persons are those 
who reside and conduct activities within a project zone, critics point out that hydropower 
development has spatial effects that stretch out beyond  the immediate project zone, most 
often in downstream effects. An example of this disconnect is found in the development 
of the NT2 project. Official numbers of affected persons according to project developers 
ranged from 5700 people requiring resettlement (EDF 2004, 8) and a further 40,000 
people being affected by the project. Independent critical reviews however cite that 
between 100,000 and 150,000 people would experience some degree of livelihood 
disruption due to the project both in the immediate project area and downstream. The 
Nam Theun Power Company had not explained its rationale behind the lower estimate of 
affected persons (EDF 2004, 6). Yet according to policy, persons who were downstream 
would technically not qualify for mitigation and compensation due to their spatial 
location in relation to the project site. The concession agreement between developers and 
the Lao government in regards to the construction of Nam Theun 2 also set certain 
requirements for compensation. Villagers who lost less than 10% of their productive 




entitled to replacement land (IRN 2008b, 43). Further discrepancies in official numbers to 
those of critics are found in multiple hydropower development projects across the time 
span of focus (IRN 2008b, 2010).  
Given the increasing number of planned projects, which more than likely will 
require some form of resettlement, mitigation, and compensation, it is concerning that 
these differences on the definition of resettlement, and spatial eligibility for mitigation 
and compensation are still present. As stated previously, with larger magnitudes of people 
affected by hydropower development, the mitigation of detrimental socio-economic 
impacts becomes increasingly difficult. Certain people can be considered winners and 
losers as a result of mitigation and compensation policies. Whether one is a winner or 
loser depends much on how losses are defined and one’s geographic location in relation 
to a hydropower project. Even winners may end up being losers as a result of poor 
planning and insufficient measures. 
Geopolitical Consequences of Hydropower Development 
Perhaps the most significant issue at present that concerns both geopolitics and 
hydropower development in Laos is the development of the Mekong River. Again the 
past geopolitical situation has had a major influence. Three decades of conflict has 
resulted in the Lower Mekong being in relatively pristine condition physically (Bakker 
1999, 213). Presently, the Mekong has been the subject of a new focus on hydropower 
development in the region (Hirsch 2010). At the regional level, hydropower is the most 
planned sector with long-term development plans for the region (ADB 2004b). Ranging 




on the Mekong mainstream, the Mekong is seen as the next major source of power and 
influence in Southeast Asia (IRN 2008b). 
Yet there seems to be recognition that mainstream development of hydropower 
may not be as attractive as it first seemed. The Mekong River Commission formed in 
1995, the successor to the Mekong Committee, has recognized that there existed a need 
for coordination and careful assessment of any kind of development on the Mekong, not 
just hydropower. The commission has stated that the river represents more than just a 
flow of water with hydropower potential. The river is a resource that is utilized at 
multiple scales from local livelihoods to national scale development schemes. While the 
river is “undeveloped” from an engineering and energy potential perspective, this does 
not mean that the river is not utilized. Agriculture and fisheries are still significant 
activities that contribute to the character of the basin as a whole (Bakker 1999, Bird and 
Voradeth 2008). As such the Mekong River Commission has advocated re-evaluating 
projects planned for the Mekong River by all riparian nations in light of the evolution of 
political, economic, and environmental circumstances (Bird and Voradeth 2008, 4). The 
commission has also recommended that member nations share data and information on 
potential run-of-the-river mainstream dams. Laos as a member of the commission has 
complied in 2008, providing information on eight potential dams (Bird and Voradeth 
2008, 4). 
Presently, while Laos has complied with recommendations and suggestions made 
by the Mekong River Commission, Laos recently has stated that it will not comply with a 
halt of dam development on the mainstream Mekong River, despite protests from 




Commission (Associated Press 2011a, United Press International 2010). The issue at 
hand concerns the $3.8 billion (U.S.) Xayaburi dam planned by Laos on the mainstream 
Mekong River. This dam is the first of 11 projects (9 in Laos, 2 in Cambodia) that are 
proposed along the river (United Press International 2011a, 2011c). 95% of the dam’s 
1260 MW production capacity would be slated for export to Thailand.  Using the 
common argument of economic need and utilizing the dam for its economic benefits as 
justification, the Lao government has stated that the dam would be the “first 
environmentally friendly project on the Mekong,” and “would not have any significant 
impact on the Mekong mainstream” (Associated Press 2011a, United Press International 
2011a).  
This dam project has resulted in numerous voices of opposition, even from a 
traditional political ally such as Vietnam, resulting in a rare dispute between two 
communist allies. For Vietnam, there exists major concern over the disruption of rice 
production and aquaculture on the Mekong and in the Mekong Delta. Thailand on the 
other hand, despite numerous letters and protests has remained silent on the issue quite 
possibly due to the fact that they are the intended customer for the project (Associated 
Press 2011a, United Press International 2011b).  
While projects such as these require approval on certain elements as by all four 
members as stipulated by the 1995 Mekong Agreement (Mekong River Commission 
1995), Laos reportedly began construction on the project without approval from the 
commission and in defiance of international environmental groups (Associated Press 
2011b). Additionally any decision that is made by the commission is non-binding, which 




political one. The commission itself has even expressed concern over the project, citing 
the potential environmental damage as well as a lack of information about the project. In 
light of the resistance posed by the other commission members, Laos surprisingly fell in 
line with the other members and agreed to defer a decision on the construction of the 
Xayaburi project. A meeting on the issue is expected later in 2011, with Vietnam, 
Thailand, and Cambodia all agreeing that more studies are needed in order to make a 
satisfactory decision on the construction of the project (Associated Press 2011c). 
 Interestingly the dispute over this dam has even resulted in other foreign powers 
chiming in. The U.S. State Department, while acknowledging the potential represented 
by mainstream dams in the form of economic stimulation and flood control, stated that 
there must be an awareness of the socio-economic and environmental impacts dams can 
have over the long term, and advocating better science and more informed stakeholders 
(United Press International 2011d). The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Sub-
committee on East Asian and Pacific affairs even called for a delay on any mainstream 
dam until adequate planning and multilateral coordination could be guaranteed (United 
Press International 2011c).  
This one proposed dam on the Mekong River has resulted in igniting a storm of 
debate not only among regional allies but even foreign parties with little or no direct 
interests in the project. The geopolitical situation in the region is clearly tied to regional 
development with the Mekong River at its center. While Laos had planned this project at 
a state level in terms of costs and benefits, the resulting political conflict has seen the 
project jump from the state to the national and even international scale in terms of 




water gaining greater importance in regional geopolitics, regional cooperation over water 
resources will be central in defining wider relationships between riparian nations. It 
remains to be seen what the future may hold in terms of further development and conflict 
along the Mekong River.  
Geopolitically, the development of Laotian hydropower has only recently had 
significant effects upon its geopolitical status. Given the case of the Xayaburi 
hydropower project and the situation it has caused, the Mekong region will be an area of 
geopolitical interest especially with further hydropower development. 
Conclusion 
Overall, Laotian hydropower development shows a pattern of increasing 
development in multiple forms. From the simple number of projects, to capacity, 
location, and generation, all have shown steady increases since 1998. The physical 
geography of Laos on its own merit offers substantial hydropower development 
capability, with a large amount of hydropower potential still untapped. Favorable 
investment environments created by government policy, regional electricity demand, as 
well as increased planning standards have helped to contribute to this boom. Increased 
planning standards at least on paper have helped to portray the image that Laotian 
hydropower development entails more positive effects than negative. The regional 
geopolitical situation has also spurred hydropower development, with increasing 
cooperation between nations of the Greater Mekong Sub-region following the end of the 





Hydropower development patterns however also have had impacts upon 
additional key factors related to hydropower development. The common justification of 
hydropower development for the reduction of poverty and improvement of socio-
economic status at times seems justified, yet in the example of health, the effect of 
hydropower is less clear. While critics have focused upon the loss of land related to 
hydropower development as evidenced by the local accounts, superficially at the national 
level this is not the case. The increased pace and scale of hydropower development also 
has affected process and policy related to resettlement and mitigation. It should 
acknowledged by the critics that some gains have been made since initial projects such as 
Nam Ngum 1 in various aspects such as compensation and. new institutional frameworks 
related to mitigation and compensation. Yet the lack of resources to enforce and enable 
compliance is still striking. Again, clear winners and losers will result from the 
development of the Laotian hydropower sector. Hydropower development clearly can be 






FUTURE PROSEPECTS OF HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN LAOS 
 
Introduction 
The development of hydropower in the last two decades has shown two different 
pictures, the first of stagnation and the second of rapid, large scale development. As 
evidenced by the numbers shown in Chapter IV, development plans are continuing at a 
rapid pace. This is in line with the Lao government’s goal of exiting ‘least developed 
country status’ by 2020. As previous analysis has shown, Laos is committed to 
hydropower development for the immediate future. As Table 1 in Chapter IV indicated, 
62 hydropower projects are currently in the planning stage, having memorandums’ of 
understanding signed for project development agreements and feasibility studies. Several 
factors identified utilizing the PESL framework have the ability to sharply influence 
future development patterns. This chapter briefly examines these factors in relation to the 
analysis of past and present development and discusses the role they have in influencing 
future development patterns. Beginning with electricity demand and the power market, 
the impact of future resettlement and compensation strategies, and the geopolitical 
situation will also be discussed.  
Domestic Demand for Electricity  
 Domestic demand for electricity will be a central factor in the future prospects of 
Laotian hydropower development. Official power development plans by Electricité du 




focused upon the preparation of sufficient power supplies to meet anticipated demand 
(EdL 2008, III-4). The 2008 official Electricité du Laos power development plan 
anticipates increases in domestic demand from the 4 Laotian power networks (North, 
Central 1, Central 2, South) as well as the ability to meet domestic demand until 2016 
under current plans (EdL 2008, A-2). The Electricité du Laos plan forecasts demand until 
2020, which is the date that the Lao government has set for achieving its goal of a 90% 
rural household electrification rate as part of its poverty reduction strategies (ADB 2009, 
EdL 2008, II-1, Maunsell 2004). Figure 25 details domestic energy demand by region and 
in total until 2020 in terms of gigawatts (Gw) per hour. 
 
 
Figure 25. Electricité du Laos power development plan domestic energy forecast 2005-
2020 





 As shown by Figure 25, major demand is anticipated to come from the two central 
regions. These regions are the location of the largest consumers in terms of electricity 
consumption in the form of major industrial projects such as copper and gold mining, 
steel processing, and cement factories (EdL 2008, II-4). Additional electricity demand 
will result from the rural electrification projects that aim to electrify 90% of households 
by 2020. 
Building from baselines established in 2006, the Electricité du Laos plan shows 
an average growth rate of 14% was present in terms of domestic energy demand from 
1999 to 2006 (EdL 2008, I-5). Forecasted domestic demand shows an increase of 13% 
per year until 2020, with 4.56% as residential demand and 6.97% industrial demand (EdL 
2008, A-2).  
While the Electricité du Laos plan offers a pure domestic assessment of future 
hydropower potential and plans, a power system development plan was created in 2004 
by Maunsell (2004), an independent consultant that was hired by several organizations 
including the Lao government and World Bank, to create a comprehensive report on 
present and future energy development in Laos. The Maunsell report which draws upon 
Electricité du Laos’ power development plan takes into consideration external factors 
more comprehensively. Most notably it attempts to forecast future energy demands of 
potential Laotian power customers in an attempt to guide future development on a cost-
effective path. 
The Maunsell plan offers a more grounded study, with certain growth tempered 




export prospects. Table 6 compares the forecasts for domestic demand between the 
Electricité du Laos plan, and the Manusell plan. 
Table 6. 
Laotian energy demand forecasts 2005-2020 
Year 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 
EdL Plan 1499.9 3493.2 7009.5 8549 
Maunsell Plan 1731.3 2695 3559.8 4664.2 
Source(s): EdL 2008, Mansuell 2004 
Units are in GWh 
 
The discrepancies between the two plans are a result of several factors in Maunsell’s 
computations. The Maunsell plan took into account future power grid integration, off-
grid electrification, and power load diversity in terms of residential, commercial, or 
industrial, which would result in a lower demand from the national power grids 
(Maunsell 2004, 37). 
Domestic energy demand is a factor that will need to be considered in the future 
development of the Laotian hydropower sector. As the country continues to grow in both 
population and industry, the need of more electricity will rise. Continued hydropower 
development is one method that is part of meeting this demand, and is part of the overall 
electricity development plans. The rate of hydropower development however will vary 
depending on which development plan Laos continues to follow. Domestic energy sector 
development will be tempered by amounts of capital available as well as the focus upon 
the export market. 
External Demand and Market 
The energy demands of the Laos’ perspective customers will continue to have a 




developed base and optimal scenarios based on load data of its neighbors, primarily 
Thailand and Vietnam. There is however an important caveat that the plan notes in terms 
of export development, in that there is no systematic basis for optimizing the sequence 
and timing of export projects compared to the development of the domestic system 
(Maunsell 2004, 14). While the geographic location of Laos in the Greater Mekong Sub-
region has provided it key advantages in the development of its export power market, 
Laos is at the mercy of prices with respect to the power trade. Neighboring countries do 
have alternative sources of supply in the form of oil, gas, and coal fired plants that in 
some cases may be cheaper to either buy or develop compared to purchasing hydropower 
from Laos (Maunsell 2004, 84). While not specifically mentioned by critics, this is one 
factor that has the ability to contribute to questionable financial returns which may force 
reevaluation of a project (IRN 2008b). Despite this, the Maunsell plan offers approximate 
estimates of regional power demands and their effect upon the development of the 
Laotian hydropower sector. Electricity trading already has taken place and will continue 
on several levels within the region. Figure 26 shows current amounts of electricity 
exported by Laos and imported by Thailand and Vietnam in the past 20 years. Data on 
Vietnam before 2006 however is unavailable and exact countries of origin statistics 






Figure 26. Laotian electricity export totals, Thai and Vietnamese import totals 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011 
 
Thai Electricity Situation 
 Thailand represents an important potential customer for future Laotian 
hydropower sales. Existing linkages between the Laotian and Thai power grids reduces 
the need for the construction of new power lines between the two countries. Additionally 
Laos and Thailand already engage in small-scale power trading. 
 Energy has been a key factor in Thailand's economic growth and success, which 
has depended upon external sources for nearly 60% of its commercial energy needs 
(Maunsell 2004, 53). Thai electricity demand has grown, with the annual per capita 
electricity consumption since 1985 increasing from 400 kWh per year in 1985 to 1400 




electricity consumption in the past two decades overall shows consistent increases, with 
the exception of the period around 1997 as illustrated by Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27. Thai energy consumption – 1990-2009 
Source: World Bank 2011b 
 
While the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 illustrated the sensitivity of the 
electricity market in relation to economic growth, Thailand’s electricity demand 
rebounded quickly and has continued to rise. It remains to be seen how electricity 
demand will be affected by the current global economic situation. 
On the basis of economic health, Thailand presents a relatively stable market for 
Lao hydropower exports; however there are other critical factors in determining the 
prospects for the export market to Thailand. Thailand has been building electricity 
trading relationships with other countries in the region and entered into discussions for 
the creation of frameworks for such imports (World Bank 2006). Laos also faces 




fired power plants.  In some circumstances this may be more economically friendly to the 
Thai government in terms of import and construction costs versus hydropower purchases 
from Laos (Maunsell 2004, 64). Future Lao export market planning would be advised to 
consider Thailand’s energy alternatives more carefully when analyzing future export 
hydropower projects for the Thai market, in that while Laos has adequate supply, the 
Thai demand despite the economic health, may decrease severely. 
Several factors still point in favor of a strong Thai market for Laotian 
hydropower. First, due to strong environmental opposition,  the construction of large 
scale hydropower projects in Thailand has been for the most part halted, despite an 
abundance of hydropower potential. This will result in declines from the domestic Thai 
hydropower industry. In 2003 domestic hydropower contributed only 6.3% to the total 
capacity of the Thai power system; by 2016 it is predicted to fall to 2.2% (Maunsell 2004, 
62). Purchases from Laos could be used to offset this loss in the national power system. 
The second aspect that works in Laos' favor concerning the Thai market is geographic 
location. The location of Lao projects along the north-eastern and eastern Thai border 
provide excellent areas for further connection to the Thai power grid with minimal 
distance and investment, offsetting geographic in-balances within Thailand concerning 
energy production potential. 
Vietnamese Electricity Situation 
 Vietnam is in some instances similar to Thailand, but acute differences are present 
in the context of being a power customer of Laos. In contrast to Thailand, Vietnam has an 
abundant supply of potential domestic energy sources ranging from coal, oil, gas, 




are more easily extractable (Maunsell 2004, 64). Yet similar to Thailand, Vietnam has 
experienced a period of increased electricity demand, however in the case of Vietnam 
electricity sales increased 70% faster than GDP growth with electricity consumption 
growing 16.6% per year from 1990 to 1995 (Maunsell 2004, 65). Figure 27 shows 
Vietnamese electricity consumption from 1990 to 2009. As the figure illustrates, Vietnam 
has also shown steady increased in electricity consumption. The Asian Economic Crisis 
did not affect Vietnam as severely compared to the other nations in the region, resulting 
in continued growth in electricity consumption.  
 
Figure 28. Vietnamese electricity consumption – 1990-2009 
Source: World Bank 2011b 
 
 While imports do not currently factor heavily into the Vietnamese power system, 
imports are expected to increase from 2% in 2010 to 8.9% by 2020, suggesting that 
Laotian hydropower may be used to fulfill that need (Maunsell 2004, 69).  Figure 26 




increase from 46 million Kwh in 2006 to 275 million Kwh in 2007. Import totals for 
2008 and 2009 remained around 270 to 280 million Kwh (U.S. Energy Information 
Agency 2011).  
 Electricity demand in Vietnam takes a regional character due to several factors 
including the shape of the country, the geographic distribution of energy resources, and 
past geopolitical history. Consumption and demand rates are significantly higher in the 
north and south regions compared to the central. This is in part explained by the presence 
of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi in the south and north respectively. The central region is 
also less economically developed compared to the other two regions, resulting in a lower 
consumption and demand rate. The major concern for the health of exports to Vietnam 
will rest upon the development of Vietnam's domestic energy resources. Northern 
Vietnam's system is dominated by hydropower but significant reserves of coal are 
present. Southern Vietnam has hydro production capacity, but is increasingly reliant upon 
gas fired plants to meet energy needs in the region, while central Vietnam lacks 
significant energy resources. Future demand will rest upon whether more coal fired plants 
are developed in northern Vietnam and whether gas fired plants are further developed in 
the south. If gas and coal supplies are found to be insufficient and expensive to exploit, 
hydropower from Laos may be seen as having the economic advantage versus domestic 
energy development (Maunsell 2004, 68). Despite the abundant domestic energy supplies 
present in the country, Vietnam has still signed memorandums of understanding with 
Laos for the purchase of hydropower as well as developing several projects within Laos 




Several other potential markets for Laotian hydropower were also identified by 
the power system development plan, including Cambodia, Myanmar, and Yunnan 
Province, China, however these markets are constrained, due to a lack of power demand 
as well as both Myanmar and China representing potential competitors for the Thai 
hydropower market (Maunsell 2004). 
As stated above, potential customers of Laos have alternative options, resulting in 
the situation not being one of simple supply and demand. Laos will continue to be a price 
taker unless the power situation changes in the form of depletion or the creation of 
regional frameworks for the power trade. While future memorandums of understanding 
for the construction of hydropower dams are fairly numerous, there may be little demand 
due to various external factors such as alternative energy options and the role of prices. In 
terms of domestic development, the Lao government will continue following the 
Electricité du Laos forecasts, which show major growth in the domestic energy demand. 
 As far as the external market, the government still sees hydropower as the only 
real viable source of income for national goals due to the potential and viability of the 
export market. This is evident in the pace of dam construction within Laos. Yet this focus 
on hydropower is susceptible to macroeconomic conditions which have the potential to 
derail even the best developed plans such as the case of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Future development may face new hurdles with any major regional or global economic 
stress. 
Mitigation and Compensation 
 Mitigation and compensation debates may also affect the pace and development 




standards have been created in order to pacify critics of hydropower development. These 
critics have raised attention to the negative socio-economic effects that the construction 
of large scale hydropower projects can have, as well as the lack of adequate 
compensation for losses and resettlement.  Proponents of hydropower development 
continue to state that mitigation and compensation measures are working and have made 
a positive effect. Reports by the World Bank on the resettlement undertaken in the Nam 
Theun 2 project state that the resettlement and compensation package given to villages 
affected by the Nam Theun 2 project has been effective (World Bank 2010b).  The World 
Bank reports that the package included housing, water supply and electricity, agricultural 
land, and community infrastructure, including schools, warehouses, and fertilizer 
factories (World Bank 2010b, 10). Overall success was reported by multiple agencies 
including; the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the Nam Theun Power 
Company, the developers of the project. Success was measured in several ways, most 
notably in the form of increased rice cultivation in resettlement sites with average yield 
around 1.2 tonnes, compared to pre-project numbers of 0.8 tonnes (World Bank 2010b, 
18). Other instances of success included increased household incomes, with a yearly 
income per capita around $250 U.S. dollars versus less than $150 dollars pre-project, as 
well as more physical assets such as a television or motorbike (World Bank 2010b, 28). 
  Asian Development Bank reports include quotes from villagers who have 
received compensation who say “they are better off than ever before,” and that they “miss 
the old village….but my memories of that place, the hunger and lack of modern things, 
that’s not too pleasant” (ADB 2010b, Winn and Baardsen 2010). These instances of 




the development of hydropower will continue to be beneficial given proper support, 
lending credence to the claims of projects such as Nam Theun 2 being model projects.  
 Critics however continue to question the "model project" claims that proponents 
make about Theun-Hinboun and Nam Theun 2. They also continue to question claims 
made about the standards of future projects despite statements to the contrary by 
proponents (EDF 2005b, IRN 2008a, 2008b). Several examples of the failure of 
mitigation and compensation measures are commonly found in critical arguments against 
the continued funding of Laotian hydropower. Barney (2007) in his field work at a 
village affected by the construction of the Theun-Hinboun project found that despite 
initial agricultural support through the awarding of diesel water pumps and the 
construction of irrigation channels, this support was not adequate to replace agricultural 
losses suffered by the villagers. Reasons for this failure included a lack of money for fuel, 
lack of completion of irrigation channels, and decreasing harvests with increasing input 
costs (Barney 2007, 25). The Theun-Hinboun Power Company, the primary developer 
and operator of the project, blamed the failure on the villagers and their lack of 
cooperation and initiative (Barney 2007, 27). The company was also the primary party 
responsible for implementing mitigation and compensation measures. Other examples of 
what critics state as failures of mitigation and compensation include: lack of potable 
water supplies in the Nam Luek project, despite promises of a new water supply by 
project authorities; undue emphasis upon new methods of agriculture such as irrigate dry 
season rice production, and a lack of adequate options for replacement housing in the 




 Given these examples, hydropower critics advocate ceasing financial support for 
large scale hydropower projects unless mitigation and compensation policies, procedures, 
and standards are followed and met (EDF 2005b, IRN 2008b, 2009). Much of this 
criticism is directed at public financing organizations such as the Asian Development 
Bank and World Bank, both major financial supporters of Laotian hydropower projects 
(ADB 2010b, World Bank 2009, 2010b). If these institutions were to withhold funding 
unless mitigation and compensation standards were met, this could severely impact the 
pace of future hydropower development in the country given the large amounts of capital 
given for hydropower development. Yet the current track record of projects built with 
support from these organizations indicates that this more than likely will not happen, 
resulting in the continuation of support. 
Highly related to the role mitigation and compensation will have is the continued 
role of private investment (IRN 2008b, 14). The shift to private investment versus 
multilateral funding is a trend that will continue into the future in the financing of large 
scale hydropower projects. This is concerning for future mitigation and resettlement 
policy as private investors in general have less stringent standards concerning safeguards 
and mitigation policy compared to institutions such as the World Bank and the ADB 
(Hirsch 2010, Imhof 2006). While private investors wish to display an image of concern 
in order to avoid criticism which may impact the approval and construction of potential 
projects, it is clear that projects having less parties involved will have more freedom in 
planning, application, and implementation of  safeguards.  
 The rise of private investment in the Laotian hydropower sector has also resulted 




ADB in terms of mitigation and safeguards. Hirsch (2010) argues that multilateral 
funding institutions will have continued influence due to the funding of transmission lines 
and involvement in past projects.  Critics believe the future will see the influence of these 
institutions decline even more due to having no real enforcement powers, as well as being 
unwilling to exercise the limited recourse options at their disposal such as suspending 
loan and grant disbursements (EDF 2005b, IRN 2008a). 
Geopolitics 
As stated in the previous chapter, hydropower development patterns in the Lao 
PDR may be significantly affected by regional geopolitical dynamics. Hydropower 
development can have significant geopolitical ramifications that must be taken into 
account when discussing future large scale transboundary hydropower projects. The 
geographic location of Laos in the Greater Mekong Sub-region will continue to result in 
hydropower development and development of the Laotian power system taking on an 
increasingly regional dimension (Maunsell 2004, 38). The power system development 
plan by Maunsell has stated that greater cooperation between the GMS countries has 
increased in the last 10 years and will need to continue to increase if the hydropower 
sector in Laos is to flourish. Additionally it notes that Lao national plans must be in sync 
with regional plans concerning hydropower development. Uncertainty is still present 
however over the pace of integration into the GMS power grids as well as the extent of 
the involvement of the private sector (Maunsel 2004, 24).  
The further development of mainstream Mekong River hydropower dams may 
prove to be one of the largest sources of potential geopolitical conflict in the region. As 




Mekong River is beginning to face more opposition. Yet this opposition is now in the 
form of national governments, other than the traditional local and NGO opponents of 
hydropower development. At the end of 2011, a decision on the Xayaburi Dam by the 
Mekong River Commission has been postponed again due to continued concerns by 
Vietnam and Cambodia about the potential impacts upon fisheries and livelihoods of their 
citizens (BBC 2011). Further analysis is planned on the potential impact of the Xayaburi 
Dam by a Japanese firm that has been contracted by the Mekong River Commission 
(BBC 2011b). Yet given the amount of debate and discussion concerning just one project, 
it remains to be seen how much more conflict will be spurred by more debate on future 
projects.  
While Cambodia has planned Mekong River dams as well, they have not acted in 
the manner Laos has in past and present. Laos has pushed ahead with plans for 
mainstream development with little to no public discussion, reflecting a strong reaction 
by Laotian leaders at any outside interference in hydropower development (Hirsch 2010, 
316). A number of future projects have been planned for the Mekong mainstream by 
Laos. Figure 28 shows the location of several planned Mekong mainstream dams. 
The role China has geopolitically must also be mentioned when discussing 
mainstream Mekong development. China to this point has been the only nation to build 
hydropower dams on the mainstream Mekong with at least eight further dams planned. 
Chinese dams however are being blamed for decreased water levels downstream 
threatening food security and ecological heath (BBC 2011a). China has rejected these 





Figure 29. Mainstream dams on the Mekong River 
Source: BBC 2011 
basin has been affected, stating that, “the water level decline of the Mekong River has 
nothing to do with the hydropower development” (BBC 2011a). While dialogue and 
information sharing with China was noted as positive, it remains to be seen if it remains 
constant. This situation reflects how the development of transboundary waters may stir 
potential disagreements, and could provoke geopolitical conflict. While not to the stage 
of a “water war” as potentially hypothesized by Furlong (2006), Gleditsch et al (2006), 




(1999) believes, good water management strategies between nations can diffuse potential 
water and ecological conflicts (Bakker 1999, 221).  
Conclusion 
 Future Laotian hydropower development will be influenced by several key 
factors. Increasing domestic demand will result in a need to supply the country with more 
electricity. Hydropower is certainly one avenue available to supply this demand, but 
competition from the focus on the external market may result in alternative means to 
meet this demand. The external market will continue to be an influence upon future 
hydropower development, given the strength of the Thai market, and the possibilities that 
exist in Vietnam. Increasing consumption levels will require meeting the demand for 
electricity, again Laotian hydropower may be the solution. Yet external factors such 
alternative energy options in the form of oil, gas, and coal, as well as potential economic 
downturns may result in another bust period for Laotian hydropower development. 
 Continued focus upon mitigation and compensation issues by critics of 
hydropower may also have influence to future development by forcing a reconsideration 
or re-analysis of projects, however as the track record seems to indicate; public financing 
will continue to support hydropower. An increasing level of private financing with more 
lax standards will also result in more projects with continued concerns over mitigation 
and compensation issues. Lastly the regional geopolitical situation will continue to be 
worth examining in relation to the future of Laotian hydropower development. With 
future plans for mainstream development of the Mekong River, and given the debates and 








 The past two decades have seen both booms and busts in terms of Laotian 
hydropower development. Laos as a least-developed country has attempted to utilize its 
geographic advantage of being a region rich in hydropower potential, and its proximity to 
potential customers to earn much-needed revenue for development. Throughout this 
study, the PESL framework has assisted in identifying several key factors in relation to 
Laotian hydropower have been found. While this information is very important, it must 
also be noted that this study was constricted by several limitations that leave room for 
future research opportunities.  
Primary Findings 
 Development patterns in terms of quantity of projects, capacity, electricity 
generation, and revenue clearly have shown periods of growth and decline for the last 20 
years. Both the capacity of projects and amount of electricity generated by hydropower 
has increased as well as the total production capacity of Laos. Capacity and the number 
of projects will continue to rise throughout the next decade. Every province of Laos has 
at least one or more hydropower project planned or already in operation for the time 





Remaining highly questionable is whether hydropower revenue is actually having a 
tangible effect upon socio-economic development and poverty reduction as stated by 
hydropower proponents. The analysis of the socio-economic consequences of 
hydropower development was inconclusive at best. Nationally, agricultural losses were 
not present, in either rice production or land loss, however as stated this may be due to 
government misrepresentation or different criterion of what constitutes land loss and food 
production. Improvements were also seen in such proxies as life expectancy and health 
spending, but without accurate and comprehensive revenue spending data, the 
relationship between hydropower and these variables is speculative at best, despite the 
positive statements by hydropower proponents.  
 Large scale hydropower development will continue to be justified on the basis of 
economic contribution and geographic viability. The revenue estimate of the contribution 
to the GDP is one such economic factor that will be used to support the planning and 
construction of future projects. Yet this is troublesome, as according to estimates in the 
study, export electricity revenue is actually contributing less and less economically. 
Given the decreasing contribution of export revenues, the decisions made to further 
expand and increase hydropower project construction and capacity can be considered 
questionable by the Lao government.  
 Hydropower projects will continue to find support from international actors such 
as the Asian Development Bank and World Bank who see hydropower as a positive force 
for change and transformation in the region. These organizations will continue to focus 
on the role hydropower plays for the development of Laos in terms of poverty reduction 




government has limited capacity and management to deal with the regulation and 
management, of both the hydropower construction process as well as the management of 
the large amounts of money involved. The lack of strong institutions, monitoring, and 
accountability for the mitigation and compensation of hydropower development’s 
negative effects will continue be a point of contention between supporters and critics of 
hydropower development in Laos.  
 A major dilemma remains however, in that if there is a lack of resources then 
there is no development, however if there is no development, then no resources can be 
exploited, hence a "chicken and egg" debate of which needs to come first.  The problem 
currently is finding the best balance in terms of policy making between the requirements 
placed upon developers and the Lao government in order to gain funding for these 
projects, developing said projects within time requirements, and the need to maintain 
sustainable yet profitable resource bases for the future.  
 The creation of new policies and laws has served to create an environment that 
appeals to large scale investments for hydropower. The Law on the Promotion of Foreign 
investment as a primary example encourages investment in hydropower via offering 
financial incentives and guarantees in regions that are most suited for hydropower 
development. Additional policies and laws relating to socio-economic consequences and 
mitigation and resettlement issues create the image that the Lao government recognizes 
the negative impacts hydropower can have, and is working to solve these issues. This 





 The relationship of hydropower and geopolitics is another point of continued 
interest in the Laotian context. The historical geopolitical situation has helped to explain 
a severe lack of development pre-1990. Yet the geopolitical situation has also presented 
opportunities and obstacles to future Laotian hydropower development. With increasing 
regional rapprochement, bi-lateral investment, and the strengthening of regional ties, 
prospects for cooperation in developing projects and the creation of new export markets 
are strong. Yet as illustrated by the case of the Xayaburi dam on the mainstream Mekong 
River, hydropower can also have an effect on geopolitics. Vietnam’s disagreement with 
Laos on that project on the basis of negative environmental change and threats to food 
security is indicative of the controversial nature of large scale hydropower development. 
Regional development will continue to rely on geopolitical stability. Geopolitical conflict 
arising from the development of the Mekong River and its hydropower resources may 
derail future initiatives regionally, and while not at the stage of a “water war,” the 
situation warrants continued attention. 
 Future prospects for the continued development of large scale hydropower 
projects in Laos will continue to be driven by both export market and domestic demand. 
Increasing domestic demand as well as government goals of achieving a 90% household 
electrification rate will result in Laos seeking more electricity. What remains unknown is 
whether the electrification goal is feasible, given the required amounts of funding and 
improvements in the electricity distribution system that are needed. Continued purchases 
from independent power production projects are also another factor that is worth 




potential hydropower sites are being scouted for export projects, resulting in increased 
purchases of electricity from independent sources. 
 The situation of Laos’ export prospects is not a simple supply and demand 
problem. The possibility of volatile export markets as well as the possibility of 
competition from its neighbors will continue to make the focus upon hydropower a high 
risk proposition for Laos. Thailand and Vietnam present stable and strong economic and 
political conditions for the export of hydropower, however caveats exist. Both Thailand 
and Vietnam will continue to have alternative energy production options such as coal, gas 
and oil fired plants for the production of electricity. While these prospects are based upon 
predictions and estimates that appear strong on paper, history must be considered when 
discussing the future. As the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 demonstrated, economic 
shocks can severely impact electricity demand, and in turn hydropower development. A 
weakened export market given the amount of investment and development already under 
taken by Laos in the hydropower sector, would entail severe negative consequences for 
the Lao economy and leave the country on the hook for the multiple costs of hydropower 
development. 
Study Limitations 
 Several limitations presented themselves at times during this study that hindered 
analysis. Most notably, a lack of comprehensive statistics relating to hydropower revenue 
income and spending limited the analysis of the effects of hydropower on socio-economic 
variables. Due to the lack of firm revenue spending data, the use of proxies was required 
in an attempt to validate the positions taken by supporters and critics. Related to this was 




directly from Laos concerning revenue and socio-economic variables were either non-
existent, restricted, had to be found through tertiary sources such as the World Bank and 
United Nations, or estimated as in the case of the hydropower revenue totals. 
Additionally, import and export amounts of electricity for countries in the region were 
compiled as one amount. Firmer conclusions could have been garnered if these amounts 
were delineated by country, ex: total amount of Lao electricity exports to Thailand, 
Vietnam, etc. Validity of several statistics such as agricultural land available and amount 
of rice produced are examples of statistics for which reports may be inaccurate, due to 
differences in definition of agricultural loss or who constitutes a rice producer. 
 Another major limitation was in the lack of diversity for sources of information. 
Much of the information relating to the negative aspects of hydropower development was 
only found in reports by NGO’s who are noted critics of hydropower. Similarly, much of 
the information on the positive effects was from developers, project financers, and other 
proponents of hydropower development whose biases are inherent in their positions. 
Mass media news articles and academic journal articles helped to supplement the 
analysis, but more independent studies by neutral parties would have benefited the 
analysis.    
 Lastly the study was constrained by a lack of Lao language comprehension and 
the absence of a fieldwork component. Several documents and web-sites concerning the 
Laotian hydropower sector were only available in the Lao language, and several 
translations were questionable due to being financed by the Lao government. A field-




officials and villagers’ perspectives currently are, however this would prove beyond the 
logistical limitations of the research project. 
Future Research Prospects 
 Future research, besides concentrating on the points mentioned above should 
focus on developing more complete statistics in relation to hydropower revenue. Revenue 
data would help to validate either supporters or critics’ positions on the actual impact of 
large scale hydropower development. More studies and access to project sites by 
academics that are independent of either project supporters or anti-hydropower NGO’s 
could also help to shed further light on the local level impacts of Laotian hydropower 
development. Similar to what Singh (2009) accomplished, a more open study of not only 
hydropower’s effects at local levels but how hydropower is perceived at local levels 
would help shed understanding on why at times there seems to be no local scale voice on 
hydropower development. Research examining the application of solutions at multiple 
scales in terms of mitigating the negative effects of hydropower development would be 
beneficial in determining whether solutions devised at the local level or national level are 
more appropriate. 
 A major factor that deserves further attention is the impact of hydropower 
revenue. While revenue was shown to increase at the close of the century, in the last ten 
years, electricity export revenue has decline to the point where its contribution to the 
national economy could be considered minimal rather than substantial. The export 
revenue estimate in the study serves as a baseline to examine the pattern of revenue, but 
without firm data, there will continue to be much speculation on the actual impacts of 




 The shift from public to private support for hydropower will also continue to 
merit attention. As stated previously in Chapters IV and V, private investors will 
generally have more lax standards in terms of environmental impacts, and mitigation and 
compensation issues. The large numbers of projects that are either under construction or 
are planned for the future are evident of this trend. Many projects that are selected are 
sub-optimal in terms of these standards and do not sufficiently consider the actual costs 
of development. While certain large scale projects such as Theun-Hinboun and Nam 
Theun 2 have had significant support from international lending agencies, many of the 
future projects for Laos are increasingly privately funded, constructed and operated. This 
trend will continue to fuel concerns over the future of environmental and social standards 
in hydropower development. 
 The focus on Laos may have produced contextual situations and constraints that 
are unique to Laos. Studies on the development process in other regions such as South 
America where hydropower is also being developed would provide a helpful comparison 
to determine generalities common to the hydropower development process. Comparisons 
to the development history in industrialized nations would also serve the purpose of 
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